BALLOT MEASURES: REFLECTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

2016 Election Cycle
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Colorado Health Foundation would like to thank the members of Vantage Evaluation for their work on this study.

Elena Harman, PhD, helps purpose-driven organizations implement meaningful evaluation strategies that generate actionable information. Elena has dedicated her life to Colorado and evaluation as a means to improve the lives of state residents. She brings a deep expertise of systems, nonprofits and foundations in Colorado and how to engage diverse audiences in a productive conversation about evaluation. Prior to launching Vantage Evaluation in 2013, Elena was an internal evaluator at the Colorado Health Foundation, where she helped launch the Foundation’s Measurable Results model, a nationally recognized approach to collective impact and shared measurement. Elena holds a bachelors in brain and cognitive sciences, with a minor in political science, from M.I.T and both a masters and PhD in evaluation and applied research methods from Claremont Graduate University.

Kayla Brooks, MA, specializes in making sense of large, messy data sets. Prior to joining Vantage, Kayla was an internal evaluator at One Earth Future Foundation, where she established and maintained internal organizational monitoring systems and collaborated with program staff to build and maintain appropriate database structures to support data collection and meaningful analysis for quarterly and yearly reporting. Kayla has worked on evaluation projects measuring multi-stakeholder collaboration and cooperation using Social Network Analysis and the effect of micro-finance loans on increasing the number of women-led business owners in fragile states such as Somalia to support economic development and stability. Kayla holds a bachelors in psychology, with a minor in sociology, from the University of Colorado at Denver and a masters in research methods and statistics from the University of Denver.

Natalie De Sole, MSW, supports clients to see the big picture of how their work fits into a larger context. Before Vantage, she worked with SPEC Associates where she engaged in over 20 tailor-made evaluations aimed to help foundations and nonprofits learn. She worked on multi-year, national evaluations for the Lumina Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, assessing their respective initiatives’ impact on higher-education state policy and university policies. Natalie also managed multi-year, cohort-based evaluations for stand-alone organizations aimed at increasing the number of unrepresented populations in graduate research programs and a university-nonprofit collaboration to increase use of data. Over the past eight years, Natalie conducted evaluations in diverse settings including rural South Africa, urban Ghana, urban and tribal indigenous settings, and Detroit. She received her master of social work focused in social policy and evaluation from the University of Michigan, and her area of practice was community and social systems.
# Table of Contents

**Introduction** ................................................................. 4  
Background ........................................................................... 4  
Review of Key 2016 Ballot Measures ......................................... 5  
Report Structure ..................................................................... 6  
Ballot Measure Road Map: How to Navigate the Journey .......... 7  

**Section I: Lessons Learned Across Ballot Measures** ........ 11  
  Key Levers in the Ballot Measure Life Cycle ......................... 12  
  Ballot Development ........................................................... 12  
  Governance ......................................................................... 13  
  Funding ................................................................................ 15  
  Leveraged Optimal Actions ............................................... 16  
  Implementation ..................................................................... 18  
  Influencing Factors ............................................................ 19  
  Amendment 71: Raise the Bar ........................................... 20  
  Optimal Actions by Stage of the Ballot Measure Journey ....... 22  

**Section II: Lessons Learned by Ballot Measure** ............... 24  
  Amendment 70: Minimum Wage ....................................... 26  
  Amendment 69: ColoradoCare ......................................... 32  
  Boulder Sugary Drink Tax 2H .......................................... 38  
  Amendment 72: Tobacco Tax .......................................... 45  
  Larimer County Behavioral Health Tax Issue 1A ............. 51  
  Colorado Priorities Fiscal Reform ................................... 57  

**Section III: Future Considerations for Advocates and Funders**  62  
  Takeaways ........................................................................... 62  

**Section IV: 2016 Election Cycle** ....................................... 64  
  Statewide Ballot Initiatives .............................................. 65  
  Municipal Election Results .............................................. 66  

**Section V: Methods** ......................................................... 67  
  Recruitment ......................................................................... 67  
  Interview Method and Analysis ....................................... 67  
  Interview Protocol ............................................................ 68

---

**About the Colorado Health Foundation**
The Colorado Health Foundation is bringing health in reach for all Coloradans by engaging closely with communities across the state through investing, policy and advocacy, learning and capacity building. For more information, please visit [www.coloradohealth.org](http://www.coloradohealth.org).

**About Vantage Evaluation**
Vantage Evaluation is a Denver-based evaluation consulting firm, helping purpose-driven organizations understand what's working and what could be working better for our communities. Vantage is a team of life-long learners, dedicated to helping clients find the joy in evaluation through services that balance rigor and accessibility.
Introduction

BACKGROUND

Colorado is one of 14 states that allow citizen-led initiatives to go directly on the ballot. In 2016, the Colorado ballot included numerous local and statewide ballot measures, which required substantial coalition-building and advocacy efforts. The 2016 election cycle created an opportunity for collection and evaluation of learnings about ballot measures as a policy tool. The diversity of topics, approaches and outcomes created a powerful opportunity to cull lessons learned and provide useful information to advocates and funders for their consideration in future election cycles.

In response to this opportunity, the Colorado Health Foundation (the Foundation) hired Vantage Evaluation to conduct a qualitative postmortem evaluation of the ballot measure life cycle, focusing on six case studies (summarized on page 5):

- Amendment 70: Minimum Wage (passed)
- Amendment 69: ColoradoCare (failed)
- Boulder Sugary Drink Tax 2H (passed)
- Amendment 72: Tobacco Tax (failed)
- Larimer County Behavioral Health Tax Issue 1A (failed)
- Colorado Priorities Fiscal Reform (stopped collecting signatures; wasn’t submitted as a ballot measure to the Colorado secretary of state)

The evaluation focused on the following key questions:

1. For each ballot measure, what were the key strategic decisions, challenges and successes throughout the life cycle of the ballot process?

2. What key themes influenced the difference in outcomes between 2016 ballot measures?

3. Based on the successes and challenges of 2016 ballot measures, what learnings can inform future efforts? For advocates? For funders?

# Review of Key 2016 Ballot Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballot Measure</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amendment 70: Minimum Wage</strong></td>
<td>Proposed an increase in the minimum wage to $9.30 in 2017, $10.20 in 2018, $11.10 in 2019 and $12 in 2020. After 2020, annual adjustments would account for increases in the cost of living. For employees who regularly receive tips to supplement a base hourly wage, no more than $3.02 in tip income could be used to offset the minimum wage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amendment 69: ColoradoCare</strong></td>
<td>Proposed the establishment of a statewide program to provide universal health care coverage and finance health care services for Colorado residents. A 10% payroll tax (with employers paying 6.67% and employees paying 3.33%) and a 10% tax on nonpayroll income would fund ColoradoCare. A 21-member board of trustees would operate the program as a cooperative and would decide whether taxes should be further increased to fund the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boulder Sugary Drink Tax 2H</strong></td>
<td>Proposed a 2 cent per ounce excise tax on the distribution of beverages with at least 5 grams of added caloric sweeteners (e.g., sugar and high-fructose corn syrup) per 12 fluid ounces within the City of Boulder. Revenue from the sugary drink tax would be used to improve health equity in Boulder through the support of health promotion, general wellness programs and chronic disease prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amendment 72: Tobacco Tax</strong></td>
<td>Proposed increasing the tobacco tax per pack of 20 cigarettes by $1.75 (bringing the total tax to $2.59 per pack) and the tobacco tax for other tobacco products to 22% of the manufacturer’s list price (excluding e-cigarettes). Revenue from the tobacco tax would be distributed across research on tobacco-related health issues (27%); health-related programs (18%); education and prevention (16%); veteran employment, health improvement and homelessness prevention (14%); and other areas (25%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Larimer County Behavioral Health Tax Issue 1A</strong></td>
<td>Proposed a 0.25% sales tax in Larimer County for 25 years to fund the land for, and construction of, a 51,000-square-foot behavioral health facility. The facility would provide acute treatment, substance abuse detox and treatment, and intensive residential treatment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colorado Priorities Fiscal Reform</strong></td>
<td>Proposed the allowance of the state to keep any revenue over the TABOR cap until 2026. Retained revenue would fund preschool through 12th-grade education, vocational education, higher education, highways, bridges, mass transit, behavioral health services and senior health services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Report Structure

To answer the key evaluation questions posed at the beginning of the project, Vantage Evaluation invited 43 key stakeholders in Colorado who were engaged in the 2016 ballot process to participate in interviews. These stakeholders were identified either by the Foundation or through our snowball sampling method, where we had existing stakeholders recruit future participants. We interviewed 22 representatives from national, state and grassroots organizations and consultants. They were asked to share their perceptions of the ballot measure life cycle, specifically:

- How and why they were involved in the policy issue and ballot effort
- What strategic decisions were made once the campaign began (e.g., governance and funding)
- What they perceived as key successes and challenges of their ballot effort
- What key lessons did they learn from their involvement in the ballot effort

We synthesized the findings from these interviews at two levels.

First, we looked across ballot measures to identify the key factors in a ballot measure’s life cycle. By looking across the six case studies, we were able to pinpoint key themes that influenced the outcomes and key lessons for funders and advocates. These findings are presented in Section I. As part of this analysis, we created a map summarizing the key success drivers and barriers throughout the ballot measure life cycle. We also assessed the extent to which each of the 2016 ballot measures effectively mobilized these success drivers and overcame barriers.

Section I also includes considerations for future ballot measures related to Amendment 71: Raise the Bar; a summary of the local and statewide ballot measures submitted to the secretary of state in 2016; and optimal actions and key challenges that advocates and funders should consider when developing a ballot measure.

Second, we looked at key strategic decisions, challenges and successes that occurred throughout the life cycle of each ballot measure. We created a summary table for each ballot measure that identifies successes that could be replicated and challenges that should be improved or included in future ballot measures of similar contexts. These findings are presented in Section II.

We were also interested in knowing which lessons would be most important for advocates and for funders from the many themes presented throughout this report, which is presented in Section III.

The methods used in this postmortem evaluation are presented in Section IV.

A Note about “n”

We consider the unit of analysis throughout this report as a ballot measure, not an interviewee. When we state that a finding is n=5, it indicates that the finding came up in conversations about five out of six ballot measures.

Results Not Representative of the Colorado Health Foundation Opinion

This data is limited by the willingness of potential interviewees to participate in the study. The stories represented here are not representative of the Foundation’s opinion. They are representative of the data available at the time of the study.
related Ballot Measures
Section I: Lessons Learned Across Ballot Measures

First, we highlight aspects of the ballot measure life cycle. We look at the key themes that influence the outcomes of ballot measures:

- Ballot development
- Governance
- Funding
- Leveraged optimal actions (campaign messaging and grassroots) implementation
- Influencing factors

Specifically, this discussion addresses the key success drivers of ballot measures. Relevant comments from stakeholders interviewed for this project are included in the report.

Following this analysis is a listing of the statewide ballot initiatives filed in 2016 and a brief discussion of Amendment 71: Raise the Bar, an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that increases the difficulty of introducing constitutional amendments to the ballot. The success of Amendment 71 in 2016 presents new considerations that funders and advocates should think through in future policy change efforts.

Finally, we focus on optimal actions and challenges associated with every stage of a ballot measure's life cycle: considering whether to launch a ballot measure, developing the ballot measure, submitting the ballot measure, submitting signatures, winning the election and implementing the ballot measure.
### KEY LEVERS IN THE BALLOT MEASURE LIFE CYCLE

All data for the key levers came from interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballot Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballot Development</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The way a ballot measure develops matters. Coalitions are most successful when ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... a ballot measure is the right tool for the issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot measures are an expensive and time-consuming political change tool, but they are ideal for policies that require tax increases in Colorado and invoke the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR). TABOR requires a citizen vote (n=6). Ballot measures also allow for quick change, affording situations with smaller windows of opportunity a way to implement policy (n=1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The only way to raise taxes is to do it by a vote of the people, because we have TABOR and because of the legislature’s inability to raise taxes, and so, that is a no-brainer. If you’re going to try to do something to raise taxes, you have to go through the initiative process.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... they are systematic and transparent about why they are proposing the measure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns need to use policy research (e.g., document and policy reviews) and political opinion research (e.g., polling, focus groups) to ensure that the policy resonates with the public and creates a strong case for the change (n=6). Campaigns with more transparent vetting and information-sharing processes (n=2) build better buy-in among coalition members and funders, and in turn better prepare them to face opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“… I think we might have been able to get more money if we had a more open input process on what we were going to [fund and] how high the tax would be. ... Certainly, the high amount that we went for is what attracted big [opposition].”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... language is carefully constructed to prevent opposition challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The details of ballot language are key entry points for oppositional challenges to a campaign. The easiest way for the opposition to target a campaign is through the ballot measure’s language (n=2). Opposition campaigns will exploit weaknesses in the policy language to develop countermessages (n=1) or contest the legality of a measure before it is approved (n=2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The content was ... written very quickly; it was written by very passionate and dedicated ... true believers, who lacked — in my opinion — the political sophistication and legal sophistication necessary to really successfully navigate this process.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... available financing matches the resources of likely opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies that challenge the resources of “Big Corporations” should be prepared to face legal challenges for impeding the approval of the ballot (n=2). These large corporations can bring in national dollars to support their opposition, so having quick access to additional funds in a time of need is essential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the benefits of early filing for a title are weighed against the downsides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic considerations must be given to the timing of submitting and approving ballot language. While early approval of one’s ballot measure creates a competitive advantage for securing resources (n=3), it also gives the opposition more time to shape its “No” campaign (n=1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance structure impacts the success of ballot measures. Effective structures feature …</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>… strategically segmented levels of involvement.</strong> Governance structures that segment levels of involvement and power into three areas increase a campaign’s access to human and financial capital (n=2). For example:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Executive committee, with the most decision-making power and highest expectations for contributing resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Steering committee, with some inclusion in the decision-making process and some expectations for contributing resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Broader committee, community members and organizations who generally support the campaign’s purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fast nature of campaigns creates a natural gravitation toward centralizing power and simpler structures (n=4), typically having only two committees and limited engagement with those not in the executive committee. The lack of engagement reduces involvement from a broader array of constituents. According to interviewees, if the campaign manager was hired before the coalition was formed (n=1), power was less likely to leave the hands of a select few and limited the amount of feedback and inclusion in decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The criteria [for involvement in a committee] … [were] developed by the members of the executive committee, with some input from the campaign consultants and others trying to figure out how much money we had to raise and what we had to do. We did involve some of … the members of the steering committee … to make sure that people felt as comfortable as they could with those different levels and how that was to be determined.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>… clearly defined skills and expectations of coalition members.</strong> Campaigns that pause to intentionally consider setting expectations and who to involve create stronger cohesion among coalition members (n=5). Interest, experience and sympathy for a cause are important, but more is needed to set up a successful campaign (n=1). Executive committee members need to bring in a host of different capacities, including policy development knowledge, modern campaigning knowledge, fundraising skills and networks. Taking time to vet out the proper coalition members helps campaigns succeed (n=1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“We had a full-day retreat and set our values, set our intentions.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SECTION I: LESSONS LEARNED ACROSS BALLOT MEASURES

| ... diverse and representative coalition members. | Although it takes significant time and many discussions to engage multiple perspectives, campaigns are more resilient when coalitions involve members with diverse backgrounds and members who represent those affected by the issue the ballot measure is trying to solve (n=4). The arising frustrations can strain campaigns (n=2), but they also create a grassroots base to support the implementation of successful ballots (n=2). Not taking time to agree on common values reduces the likelihood that broad or diverse coalition groups will succeed (n=1).

> “You really do need a whole village to make this happen — the national support, state support, local support. Leadership. Community members. People with their fingers on the pulse of what people are saying — hearing back, ‘Oh, that’s how that’s being translated,’ or, ‘Wow, we didn’t even think about that popping up.’” |

| ... multidirectional communication. | Campaigns that use multidirectional forms of communication (up-down, down-up, lateral) increase buy-in across time, making those campaigns more resistant to the oppositional forces, as well as the strain of engaging in campaigns (n=2). |

| ... effective use of external consultants. | Campaigns that effectively use external technical experts (n=4) have more positive outcomes. Executive committees that trust experts to do their job are better managers (n=2). Also, different technical consultants are useful at specific stages of the campaign. For example, when developing a ballot measure, the 2016 campaigns hired policy analysts, pollsters and legal advisors to reduce problems that arose in relation to language, which served as an effective defense against opposition. During the campaign, media consultants, communication consultants and fundraising experts help build structure and articulate messages related to ballot measures. Some campaigns hire communication consultants to monitor which messages are successful. Smart campaigns vary their use of technical experts based on their particular needs. For example, to buffer against the opposition’s successful messaging that small businesses will suffer if a measure goes through, one could hire a small business consultant to rally support and representatives from the small business community (n=1).

> “I think making sure that you have an executive committee that understands that once you’ve hired a team, you’ve got to let them do their job. … And you, your friends and your peer group are probably not the target for the campaign messages.” |
### Funding

**Ballot measures require a lot of money. Funding should be...**

| **... available.** | Lack of funds compound other issues (n=3) during the life cycle of a ballot measure. Without adequate funding, it is difficult to make strategic decisions (n=1), campaigns are less able to react to external forces (n=1) and it is harder to leverage funds from other donors (n=1).

> “As you probably know, the larger contributors don’t want to be the first to contribute. But if somebody else contributes a large amount, then they come in and want to participate. If the [investment] had come in a lot earlier, I think our fundraisers would have had more leverage with some of the other big contributors.” |

| **... infused consistently throughout a campaign.** | While almost all campaigns want early funds (n=6), consistent infusion of funds throughout the campaign matter more (n=3). Securing early funds help campaigns plan and make strategic decisions (n=2), but secured commitments can fall through (n=1). Campaigns need funds at all the following key stages: developing the ballot measure, gathering signatures and building public awareness of the issue leading up to the campaign. Not having any funds at the end of a campaign is far more detrimental than struggling midway through (n=2).

| **... diversified.** | Campaigns that diversify their revenue streams (local cash, national cash and in-kind resources, such as hours volunteered) increase their financial well-being and reduce costs through hours donated by committee members and grassroots groups (n=3).

| **... informed by ongoing research.** | Knowing the amount of funds needed in advance is difficult for campaigns because each campaign is unique. Continuing to use research (focus groups, polling, policy analyses) to develop a budget (n=2) and using polling over the course of the campaign helps keep a pulse on how much more money needs to be raised (n=1). The types of questions that the 2016 campaigns researched during ballot development included (1) the cost of similar campaigns, (2) an estimation of how strong the opposition will fight given the type of change proposed and (3) the external climate (especially in a presidential election year). Campaigns also complete ongoing research to keep an eye on how supportive voters are of a measure and how much support the opposition gains as the election gets closer.

> “We were able to bring money in. But there was never ... a steady flow. ... We had to constantly be fundraising. ... There was no guarantee. And that's why we had different levels of the budget — like this is how we will adjust if we only get this; this is how we will adjust if we only get this.” |
### Leveraged Optimal Actions

#### Campaign Messaging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong campaign messages increased the likelihood of success. Campaign messages should be…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>... tested.</strong></td>
<td>Using policy and public opinion research to test campaigns’ targeted messages helps ensure that the messages resonate with the intended audience (n=3), whether the intended audience is supportive voters (motivating them to go to the polls and vote) or swing voters (engaging them in the issue).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>... targeted.</strong></td>
<td>Strategically thinking about what types of messages to use affects the public’s goodwill toward the campaign, keeping in mind that the best message may change throughout the campaign. Crafting initial messages so they are simple and lighthearted increases their appeal to voters (n=2). Then, if faced with significant oppositional force, and only after the public knows the ballot measure’s positive purpose, campaign tactics can pivot to attack mode and expose something negative in the opposition’s strategy (n=1), for example, exposing the fact that a large corporation is using nationally raised funds to affect local issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **... multimodal, emphasizing social media.** | Campaigns that use multiple media (e.g., TV, paid social media, paid digital media, print media and mail) to reach their targeted audience are more effective (n=3). With the rise of social media, 2016 campaigns found that outreach through billboards, mail and flyers was less effective than digital and TV ads (n=3).  
“We ran a strong social media, a strong field. We were up on TV, on cable. We had a campus activation program because polling showed us our strongest constituency were young people: 18- to 24-year-olds.” |
| **... well-funded.** | Campaign messaging requires ample funds. The lack of funds may result in messages that do not reach the target audience (n=1); the wrong choice of medium to share that message (n=1); or discontinued campaign messaging, which creates a big vacuum for the opposition to fill (n=1). |
## Grassroots Involvement: Grasstops versus Grassroots

During our interviews, two forms of public advocacy were discussed: grasstops and grassroots. Grasstops advocacy narrowly focuses on opinion leaders and those with political connections, while grassroots advocacy reaches out to people within the desired legislative district.

**Grassroots support is an important resource to spread campaign messages.**

| ... leverages broad networks to spread campaign messages; it is worth the time. | Effectively building grassroots support can significantly reduce cost as these supporters can help get out the vote and reduce the funds needed to spread the campaign message (n=2). Using grassroots support also increases buy-in from groups affected by the issues of the measure (n=4). Likewise, grassroots organizations have large networks that can be leveraged by the campaign to raise support and funding (n=2). Investing in grassroots organizations builds an infrastructure for future campaigns (n=1). Building grassroots support takes time to do well (n=1), but the benefit is worth the cost.  
   
   "Because we had spent so much time focused just on the money, which didn’t come through, the people weren’t there and the infrastructure wasn’t there to really take on what needed to be a very volunteer-based campaign.” |
| ... enables effective implementation. | Not investing in grassroots organizations reduces local buy-in for supporting the implementation of policy. When policies are attacked by exemptions, the lack of a local grassroots watchdog group leaves the policy more vulnerable to reverting or not being fully realized (n=1). |
| ... (but) is best suited for campaigns demanding on-the-ground outreach. | Engaging only grasstops is an effective strategy when campaigns require less on-the-ground outreach (n=1). For example, No campaigns, which are easier to win as few ballot measures pass (n=1), often require less need to build public awareness. |
### Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The effort does not end on Election Day. Campaigns should consider …</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… how early decisions impact implementation difficulty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Crafting a strong, well-researched ballot measure whose implementation process will be systematically absorbed by a regulatory agency (e.g., the state) increases the likelihood it will go into effect (n=2). Likewise, engaging a grassroots coalition over the course of the campaign creates a watchdog group for potential loopholes or implementation flaws (n=2).  

> “People who are involved continue to … use those social media properties to continue grassroots organizing around, [and] make sure that the implementation is consistent with, the spirit of the original ballot initiative.” |
| … retaining resources (financial and human) for implementation. |
| Campaigns are tapped out by the time implementation comes around, limiting their ability to support the implementation process (n=2). Also, when the policy’s language is vulnerable to change, the opposition may file an exemption and try to reduce the potency of the law (n=1), requiring campaigns to legally fight the exemptions.  

> “I think that, also, the thing that did not help was that we did not have money left over to be able to continue working with the communications consultant that we had. Around that stuff, the money ended, we had to write the grant reports, we used it up — all. And then, really, there was no money that was left over for, like, communications and messaging.” |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influencing Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key external factors can influence a campaign’s ability to proceed. The campaign’s reaction to these factors made the difference in some 2016 campaigns.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pros and cons of a presidential year</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While presidential years bring voters to the polls, they also increase competition for limited resources (n=6). Funders, voters, advocacy organizations, trained campaign staff and campaign volunteers are all pulled in multiple directions. It is easy for campaigns to get lost in the mayhem and forgotten (n=3).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“The other challenges we faced [were], frankly, just being in an oversaturated political environment with the presidential [race], with a senate race, with all the other ballot measures. It was a very, very difficult environment to compete in.” |

**Responding to the opposition’s tactics** |
A strong opposition requires campaigns to balance their offensive and defensive strategies. The draw to react to the opposition changes how campaigns are run (n=3). The opposition employs different tactics at different stages. For example, during ballot measure development, the opposition uses legal tactics to stop the approval of a ballot measure (n=1). Defensive tactics, such as buying out canvassing or signature-gathering agencies, dramatically increase the cost of gathering signatures and, thus, the cost for the measure to make it on the ballot (n=1). In the final stages, the opposition works to spread a No public message by outraising and outspending the Yes campaign (n=2). |

“By manipulating the market in that way, [contract signature gatherers] got really expensive. So it went from what I usually see as $1 ... $1.50, up to $3 a signature. We were looking at contracts now that were costing $8, $9, $10 a signature.” |
AMENDMENT 71: RAISE THE BAR

Amendment 71: Raise the Bar was one of the ballot measures approved by voters in 2016. Going forward, this addition to Colorado’s state constitution will make it more difficult for constitutional amendments to qualify for the ballot and to pass in future election cycles. The success of Amendment 71 introduces new considerations for advocates and for funders contemplating a ballot measure campaign to add new provisions to the state’s constitution.

The campaigns supporting and opposing passage of Amendment 71 in the 2016 election were not included in Vantage’s analysis. However, interviewees from the campaigns included in the scope of this study were asked to give their opinions about the implications that Amendment 71 could have for future ballot measure efforts. According to interviewees, Amendment 71 will make policy change efforts by constitutional ballot measure more expensive (n=5), force campaigns to propose statutory measures rather than constitutional measures (n=4), and require more legwork before proposing a constitutional ballot measure (n=4).

About Amendment 71

Amendment 71 changes the requirements for ballot measures that would make new additions to Colorado’s state constitution in the following ways:

- **To qualify for the ballot**: initiative proponents must collect certified signatures from 2 percent of all registered voters in each of Colorado’s state senate districts.

- **To be passed**: the ballot measure must be approved by a margin of 55% of voters casting votes on the measure.

However, Amendment 71’s heightened requirements to qualify for the ballot and to be approved by voters will not apply to all types of policy changes that may be attempted through the ballot process. Amendment 71 does not apply to ballot measures that would:

- Only repeal existing provisions of the Colorado constitution and make no other constitutional changes
- Create new state statutes or change or repeal existing state statutes
- Change local policy in a city, county or special district

Outcome: Passed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Yes Vote: 1,476,948 (55.69%)</th>
<th>No Vote: 1,175,324 (44.31%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Constitutional Amendment versus Statutory Proposition

The Constitution of the State of Colorado is the foundation of the laws and government of the state. This document is the foremost source of state law and is subordinate only to the Constitution of the United States. The constitution can only be amended by a vote of the people. To bring it to this vote, it may either be referred by a two-thirds vote of the Colorado General Assembly or through a citizen-initiated process (signature collection).

Colorado statutes are laws that are subordinate to the Colorado Constitution. Statutory propositions can be enacted by the Colorado General Assembly or by a vote of the people. All Colorado statutes are codified in the Colorado Revised Statutes.

---

SECTION I: LESSONS LEARNED ACROSS BALLOT MEASURES

Effect of Amendment 71 on future policy change efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The passing of Amendment 71 will ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>... increase the cost of a campaign.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Amendment 71 requires a campaign to collect signatures from each of Colorado’s 35 senate districts, which will require more money and/or a strong grassroots component for constitutional amendments but not for statutory initiatives.  
  “It’s going to require more money to go collect signatures in other communities, and/or stronger grassroots components, and/or a longer lead time to get something qualified for the ballot.” |
| **... increase the number of proposed statutory measures.** |
| Amendment 71 will force policy change efforts to be statutory measures. Statutory measures are written for and codified by the Colorado Legislature; constitutional measures are meant to change the laws written into the state constitution.  
  While the people of Colorado will still have the chance to vote on the policies proposed, it is “gonna be harder to amend the constitution.” Reducing the number of constitutional ballot measures might benefit larger, more fiscally-focused campaigns because “there’s less competition that they have to fight with to get funding.” |
| **... increase the amount of legwork required.** |
| Not only does Amendment 71 require campaigns to begin earlier to collect the required number of signatures, but it also requires campaigns to get buy-in from Colorado’s diverse population. The extra time and increased buy-in will help to develop a stronger grassroots component, which may ultimately help alleviate some of the financial burden for a campaign. Furthermore, the increased buy-in “gives home-court advantage to homegrown ideas around which there is consensus” as opposed to out-of-state campaigns trying to pass measures in Colorado. |
## OPTIMAL ACTIONS BY STAGE OF THE BALLOT MEASURE JOURNEY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Optimal Actions or Considerations</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consider Launching a Ballot Measure</td>
<td>• TABOR</td>
<td>• Funding, as ballot measures, is very expensive to do well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public support and timing (presidential year or Raise the Bar)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Best political change tool (circumventing elected officials’ unwillingness to prioritize issue)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop the Ballot</td>
<td>• Development considerations</td>
<td>• Buy-in: Getting agreement across coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Language clearly describes intentions and prevents legal loopholes.</td>
<td>• Limits: Deciding how watered down the ballot measure should be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Vetting includes political opinion research, polls and focus groups.</td>
<td>- Stick to your guns vs. gaining support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Measure appeals to stakeholders, including funders, volunteers and coalitions members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Implementation is easy and can be handed over to a governmental entity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Early funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Planning includes estimating the size of the opposition, using research to understand the threshold at which bigger oppositional forces will rise.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Communication with funders is transparent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Funding can include 501(c)3 private foundations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coalition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Governance structure is multilayered with increased responsibility (dedicated funds or in-kind support) higher in the layer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Management takes time to build common values among coalition members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# SECTION I: LESSONS LEARNED ACROSS BALLOT MEASURES

| Submit the Ballot | • Timing  
|                  | - Early submission will secure big funders, vendors and volunteers.  
|                  | - But the submission should not be too early so the opposition has less time to engage.  
|                  | • Local level opportunity  
|                  | - Ballot measures are more likely to be referred at the local level.  
|                  | • Legal challenges  
|                  | - “Big Money” opposition may use legal opposition to stop the ballot measure  
|                  | • Fewer local level ballot measures, less experience leads to complications  
|                  | • Funding: 501(c)3 private foundations are prohibited from lobbying (or earmarking funds for lobbying). Funding from these sources will likely diminish.  
| Submit Signatures | • Fundraising strategically seeks diverse funds early on and continuously throughout the campaign  
|                  | • Internal messaging strategy provides core, disciplined messages to coalition members and some flexibility that allows coalition members to adapt other messages to appeal to their constituency  
|                  | • Signature collectors are highly qualified and/or free because they are volunteers  
|                  | • Leaders continue to maintain and grow buy-in with coalition members and volunteers  
|                  | • Maintaining a balance between prioritizing fundraising and managing volunteer and broader coalition  
|                  | • Opposition money (greater than yours) leads to better messaging and better media  
| Win the Election | • Research informs the external messaging and fundraising strategies  
|                  | • Continued coalition buy-in engages coalitions to spread messages to all members within their organizations and their networks  
|                  | • External messaging strategically considers best methods to reach targeted audience and swing voters  
|                  | - Public education occurs through carefully chosen speakers who are opinion leaders and who represent a broad spectrum of voters  
|                  | - Multiple media, driven by technical experts, share the messages online or on TV (brochures and billboards tend to be less effective)  
|                  | • Fundraising  
|                  | - Communication with funders is ongoing.  
|                  | - External consultant expertise is used for quick drives.  
|                  | • Timing  
|                  | - Early submission will secure big funders, vendor.  
| Implement | • Funding to support public messaging exists after the campaign  
|          | • Grassroots organizations carry ballot measure forward  
|          | • Lack of funding to continue messaging  
|          | • Exemptions to ballot measures, which will cost campaign money  

Ballot Measures: Reflections and Lessons Learned
Section II: Lessons Learned by Ballot Measure

In this section, the six 2016 ballot measures are deconstructed. The following subsections are provided for each ballot measure:

- A summary section provides a short description of the ballot measure, including whether it was a state or local ballot measure and the outcome; the major financial contributors, collected from Ballotpedia, from the proponent and the opposition campaigns; and the takeaway, which summarizes lessons learned about the strategic decisions, key successes and challenges and external influencers.

- Ballot Development summarizes the strategic decisions behind using a ballot measure instead of other methods of policy change, steps to developing the ballot measure, and the timing of the development and submission of the ballot measure.

- Governance summarizes the strategic decisions for the campaign governance structure and the successes and challenges of that structure.

- Funding summarizes the campaign fundraising strategy, in-kind contributions and high- and low-value spends.

- Leveraged Optimal Actions summarizes the campaign messaging and communication strategy, as well as the grassroots strategy, two functions of a campaign that our findings suggest have a significant impact on the outcome.

- Implementation summarizes the next steps of the campaign and the members involved. This section only applies to three of the ballot measures.

- Influencing Factors summarizes the external factors that had an impact on the strategic decisions, successes and challenges of the campaign.

We assigned each subsection a rating using the scale on the next page. Its purpose is to highlight areas of success that could be replicated, as well as challenging areas that should be improved for future ballot measures in similar areas. The following summary table shows the ratings assigned to each subsection for each ballot measure.

Recommendations for Using this Section in Future Ballot Efforts:

- If you are planning a ballot effort similar to any of the six presented in this report, read the full summary of that measure’s journey.

- If you are planning a ballot effort that is not similar to any of the six presented in this report, find the section you are currently in or anticipate struggling with, and read that section (e.g., Governance) for each measure.
### SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED BY BALLOT MEASURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amendment 70: Minimum Wage</th>
<th>Amendment 69: Colorado-Care</th>
<th>Boulder Sugary Drink Tax 2H</th>
<th>Amendment 72: Tobacco Tax</th>
<th>Larimer County Behavioral Health Tax Issue 1A</th>
<th>Colorado Priorities Fiscal Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballot Development</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functioning</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representativeness and Inclusiveness</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-Making/Roles</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication among Coalition Members</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising and Infusions</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Kind Contributions</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High- and Low-Value Spends</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leveraged Optimal Actions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Messaging</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Involvement</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influencing Factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Year</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Adequate</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Nothing Done</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>🔺</td>
<td>🔥</td>
<td>🔴</td>
<td>🔺</td>
<td>🔴</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ballot Measures: Reflections and Lessons Learned
Amendment 70: Minimum Wage


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Pro Financial Supporters</th>
<th>Major Opposition Financial Supporters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Center for Popular Democracy Action Fund</td>
<td>• Workforce Fairness Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Fairness Project</td>
<td>• Hospitality Issue Political Action Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• SEIU COPE</td>
<td>• Colorado Citizens Protecting Our Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civic Participation Action Fund</td>
<td>• National Restaurant Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National Education Association</td>
<td>• Darden Restaurants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Takeaway (5 Interviewees, All Yes)
The campaign team invested a lot of time to develop a strong ballot measure, intentionally building a coalition and governance structure aimed at transforming society rather than just accomplishing a goal. The campaign leveraged in-kind resources from its grassroots organizations, which enabled the team to remain cohesive and maintain momentum when campaign funds were almost depleted during the summer. After this success, the campaign remains united and is now focused on its next economic advancement ballot measure.

Ballot Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The ballot measure proposed an amendment to the constitution, and therefore required a vote of the people.</strong> In 2006, the minimum wage was constitutionally amended, so the 2016 campaign knew that proposing a raise to minimum wage required a vote of the people. Campaign members decided to propose a ballot measure by petition, because they knew if they attempted a referred measure, the state legislature would likely not support it.</td>
<td><strong>The campaign dedicated time and resources to develop ballot language based on polling and expertise of the stakeholders involved.</strong> The ballot measure grew out of three to four years of conversations among advocates who have been working to change the narrative on wage for Coloradans. The initial coalition members had several conversations about whether they should pursue paid sick leave or increased minimum wage, and eventually decided on minimum wage. The executive committee and steering committee began discussions about what the minimum wage should be: $12 or $15. Public and political polling informed the campaign’s decision to go with $12. Asking for $15 was too much, while $12 was a proposal that they were confident would win and would still make a significant difference in people’s lives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome: Passed
Level: State
Yes Vote: 1,517,903 (55.36%)
No Vote: 1,224,189 (44.64%)³

### Timing

*Consensus building delayed the campaign submission of its language to the title board.* The campaign planned to submit the ballot language to the title board in December 2015 but did not submit until February 2016, which delayed the signature collection process to late April 2016.

### Governance

#### Structure

*The campaign’s structure enabled more grassroots organizations to engage in a system that usually prioritizes the ability of decision makers to provide financial resources (i.e., a “pay-to-play” model).* To do this, the campaign defined criteria for inclusion in the three levels of committees that depended on a combination of in-kind resources and cash:

- **Executive committee** (eight to 10 organizations): $20,000 to $25,000 commitment required (different amounts reported), half in cash and half in-kind.
- **Steering committee** (15 to 20 organizations): $5,000 commitment required, $1,000 in cash and $4,000 could be in kind.
- **Broader coalition** (10 to 20+ organizations): No financial or in-kind requirements. Rather, supporters generally used their name in support of the campaign and conducted outreach or publicized the issue.

#### Functioning

*The campaign was greatly aided by a vision to be transformative, not just transactional.* The vision was larger than the campaign itself. While existing as a core strength, the vision also created constant challenges to achieve a balance between achieving the current goal and building the capacity of a larger movement toward increasing equity.

*The strong internal capacity of the campaign and the effective use of external content and technical experts supported the campaign’s eventual success.* The internal capacity of the campaign was high, in part because of some coalition members with deep knowledge of politics and the economic advancement issues, and also because of the sincere dedication of those involved. Leadership was dedicated — one leader reportedly spent 20 hours per week working on the campaign. The campaign also benefited from the successful use of specific technical experts, including a media firm to handle all marketing, pollsters who continued to make sure ads and other strategies were working, a legal expert to help craft the language of the ballot and a canvassing expert who helped raise grassroots funds when dearly needed. A key game-changer was finding a small business consultant, who discovered small business owners who were supportive of the increased minimum wage.
### Representativeness and Inclusiveness

*The campaign team was intentionally diverse to be more representative of minimum wage workers.* Group members included longtime advocates for improving economic inequalities; members of grassroots organizations representing minimum wage workers; and leaders from historically economically marginalized groups, including the Latino community.

Upon reflection, interviewees concluded that the executive committee, while diverse, could have been enhanced with further inclusion of those affected by the minimum wage policy, such as community members and low-income workers, as well as representatives from the LGBTQ community, the African-American community and small business.

### Decision-Making/ Roles

*Decision-making structure and roles were clear from the outset.* The executive committee made big-picture decisions of strategic consequence by one vote per organization. Two steering committee members sat on the executive committee to enable communication and a link between the two committees. At times, the executive committee empowered smaller subcommittees to make financial decisions.

### Communication among Coalition Members

*Communication was the key reason the campaign managed to survive multiple challenges and big decisions, including:*  
- Establishing criteria for the executive committee versus the steering committee  
- Deciding whether to support both sick leave and minimum wage  
- Selecting the amount to increase minimum wage

Even though there were many disagreements, campaign leaders took the time to educate and discuss issues with coalition members to ensure their continued involvement with the campaign.

### Funding

*The campaign successfully raised national dollars, but was disappointed in its struggles to raise local dollars.* In the end, the pro campaign managed to raise enough funds to be competitive (reportedly totaling over $3.4 million). Campaign leaders targeted both local and national funders, and were grateful to donors but somewhat disappointed that their largest funds consistently came from national funders. The keys to successfully incentivizing these national gifts were to highlight Colorado as a battleground state in an election year and to underscore that the active opposition wanted to defeat the measure in Colorado and then use it as a national example.

*The campaign started with a midrange, detailed budget chosen from a group of three, ranging in sophistication and price. The team continually used the budget to inform future decisions while raising funds along the way.* At times, when strategic choices were made — like types of media to use for ads, best messages to use or type of ground game to run — the consultants and a pollster would recommend options, and the executive committee would vote.
## Fundraising and Infusions (continued)

Funding was infused throughout the campaign, but not always guaranteed. While funding was secured early on, a worrying dry spell spread during the summer of 2016. Meanwhile, the opposition grew. At one point, the campaign only had enough funding secured to ride out the month. To stay afloat, the campaign conducted spurts of funding pushes and phone drives. A final infusion of funds came in the last month of the campaign, which supported the campaign’s last drive.

## In-Kind Contributions

In-kind resources were used heavily by the campaign as a strategy to increase the opportunity for grassroots organizations to get involved and spanned from criteria to reach the upper levels of the coalition to tactics for engaging as a broader member. In this case, in-kind equated to man-hours. When financial and technical resources were scarce, the campaign relied on dedicated time, efforts and the ability of the membership to move the ground game forward.

## High- and Low-Value Spends

The campaign made strategic decisions about how to spend money in support of the ballot measure’s viability and outreach. Knowing that they were working on a tight budget, team members tried not to make risky spends. Interviewees identified three spends that were particularly influential to the campaign’s ultimate success: (1) creating a strong outreach strategy that allowed the campaign to reach voters and slow the opposition’s message (2) researching and testing a message that addressed the ballot measure’s effect on the public (3) securing the ballot measure’s viability during the development phase for polling and signature collection. Lastly, interviewees believed it was helpful to hire consultants who had the expertise to run the technical aspects of the campaign, such as canvassing.

Some spends were not effective. For example, interviewees reflected that money spent on mail and telephone vendors was not effective because the public does not pay attention to those outreach strategies as much as they did in the past. Interviewees suggested that it would be more effective to be strategic and creative about an outreach strategy instead of simply using historical methods to reach target audiences.

## Leveraged Optimal Actions

### Campaign Messaging

Disciplined campaign messaging positively influenced the public’s perception of the measure and thwarted the threat of the opposition. Upon reflection, the campaign ran TV ads that positively advertised the Amendment 70 ballot measure, which slowed the arguments of the opposition’s ads. Simultaneously, the campaign launched online digital ads that helped reach more people than traditional TV ads.
### Grassroots Involvement

The Amendment 70 campaign recognized the importance of including and supporting a robust grassroots strategy to create an inclusive campaign. In 2016, the campaign included grassroots organizations in ballot development and non-lobbying functions. With that investment, the campaign leveraged local support before it began to formally build public will. However, the interviewees reported that the campaign's pay-to-play structure reduced the number of grassroots organizations that could have a seat on the executive or steering committee.

### Grassroots Involvement (continued)

The campaign is dedicated to improving grassroots support in future policy efforts. The members of the campaign realized the significance of the grassroots voice for decision-making. They also saw the significance of dedicated time to discuss how to involve grassroots organizations in the day-to-day work of future campaigns, and how they could leverage the existing networks to raise awareness about the issue. For example, the Amendment 70 campaign brainstormed ways to have flexible buy-in models, allowing smaller organizations to pay some of their buy-in through in-kind contributions. In addition to flexible buy-in models, interviewees reflected on the importance of capacity building. Interviewees would like to teach and invest in those grassroots organizations to ensure that they grow professionally to support future ballot measures.

### Implementation

Implementation is secure because the increased minimum wage is written into the constitution. However, the state and support organizations now need to focus on appropriate enforcement of the law and future policy initiatives, which focus on improving Coloradans' livelihoods. According to interviewees, the implementation of Amendment 70 is straightforward and lies in the hands of the Colorado Department of Labor. As of January 1, 2017, all Coloradans working for minimum wage received a $1 raise; every year after that date, they will receive a raise until the minimum wage reaches $12. The Department of Labor will continue to raise the minimum wage based on inflation. During the next few years, advocates must work with the appropriate groups to help enforce the increase because some businesses will try to bypass the change. Also, some communities cannot afford to implement the minimum wage, so advocate organizations must support those communities to exempt Amendment 70 and allow them to set their own livable wages. Lastly, the campaign decided during ballot development that its work must continue beyond Amendment 70. Relationships formed during the campaign are now being carried forward to apply the knowledge gained during the Amendment 70 campaign and to support new, related policy issues.
**SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED BY BALLOT MEASURE**

The Amendment 70 campaign members realized their work was not completed once the ballot measure passed. They required budgeting ahead to support a communications person to stay on after the election, respond to inquiries and continue messaging about the issue. Campaign members planned well for how they would respond to inquiries during the campaign, but did not have a plan for how they would handle communications postelection and scrambled to respond to inquiries. Interviewees suggested that they would have benefited from budgeting for a communications staff to continue working for the campaign after the election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influencing Factors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Year</strong></td>
<td>The choice to run in a presidential election year was a strength because it increased voter participation and resulted in increased access to national funds. Interviewees expressed no regrets about choosing to run in a presidential year. Instead, they perceived it to be beneficial, not only for the number of voters who went to the polls but also for the number of funders who supported the issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition</strong></td>
<td>While the opposition was discussed in passing, it was not a key story for interviewees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Amendment 69: ColoradoCare

Proposed establishing a statewide program to provide universal health care coverage and finance health care services for Colorado residents.

Takeaway (4 Interviewees, All No)
No on 69 carefully crafted a campaign and built a statewide, broad-based coalition that effectively delegated the spread of the campaign’s well-researched message through its coalition members. The campaign effectively deconstructed the Yes campaign’s policy into a clear story of financial and structural infeasibility. It managed to bypass strong party lines in an election year by promoting three key targeted messages as the cohesive force, and then allowed organizations the flexibility to add messages that would appeal to their constituents.

Major Pro Financial Supporters
- Lyn Gullette
- Ivan J. Miller
- Ralph Ogden
- Eliza Carney
- Co-operate Colorado

Major Opposition Financial Supporters
- Anthem, Inc.
- KP Financial Services
- United Healthcare Services, Inc.
- Centura Health
- HealthOne System Support

Ballot Development

Reason

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The No on 69 campaign developed out of a reaction to the Amendment 69: ColoradoCare ballot measure from a pre-existing group of advocates, business leaders and politicians who were concerned about the consequences and feasibility of the measure. Upon reflection, the group decided to oppose the ballot measure because it was uncertain that the health care change proposed could succeed in the current health care environment, both financially and structurally, to deliver better health care for Coloradans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No on 69 was an opposition campaign and did not prepare a measure for the ballot. However, the diverse, 108-member coalition that formed and made up the campaign worked together to develop and submit a set of principles to the Colorado congressional delegation about health care reform. All 108 partners signed on to the principles submitted to the congressional delegation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome: Failed
Level: State
Yes Vote: 568,683 (21.23%)
No Vote: 2,109,868 (78.77%)4

## SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED BY BALLOT MEASURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>The opposition campaign organized after the Amendment 69: ColoradoCare ballot measure was accepted onto the 2016 ballot. The Yes campaign had filed its signatures and qualified for the ballot in November 2015, which gave the No campaign a lot of time to prepare. The No campaign presented its proposal for opposition in December 2015 and then took off running with campaign activities like fundraising, outreach and ads.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Governance | Structure | The No on 69 campaign structure allowed different levels of involvement and vast numbers of external groups. Some required pay-to-play, while some required in-kind services:
- Campaign committee: The “titular leaders” of the campaign included a bipartisan group of three big names: a Republican state treasurer, a former Democratic governor and the president of the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce. They were not involved in the day-to-day operations of the campaign.
- Executive committee: This committee reviewed decisions of the campaign committee.
- Steering committee: Members of the steering committee represented a larger group of organizations that spanned across the state and supported the campaign.

The paid consultant in charge of the day-to-day activities also sat on the campaign committee and oversaw the co-lead consultants for the campaign. |
| Functioning | The campaign carefully crafted an onboarding process to ensure that a very diverse set of coalition members could clearly articulate why they supported the No campaign. According to an interviewee with vast experience running campaigns, it is far less exciting and rewarding to oppose a ballot than to support a ballot. During the onboarding process, all coalition members were required to sign a letter containing a set of principles created by the campaign leaders to keep unity for the No campaign. The letter was signed by 108 members and then shared with congressional delegation members. The campaign worked to maintain relationships among coalition members.

The technical, strategic and political expertise of the No campaign aided its success. The campaign successfully managed its project by having a strong backbone agency, the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce. Work with the Chamber led to early commitments of funding, and experienced consultants were hired to put the structure in place. The campaign hired consultants — political policy analysts, pollsters, a media consultant, a general campaign consultant, both Republican and Democratic credentials and others — for all the major tactical areas. |
| **Representativeness and Inclusiveness** | The campaign was careful to engage a statewide bipartisan group of influential leaders. The campaign took care in gathering the right team, focusing on influential leaders who would spread the No on 69 message across the state. For example, the campaign actively reached out to influential Democrats and Republicans and invited them to participate along with state leaders, newspaper editors and Rotary club members. |
| **Decision-Making/ Roles** | The executive committee signed off on big decisions proposed by the consulting team, but stayed out of the smaller minutia. The executive committee worked internally to resolve disagreements. Decisions, as well as plans, relied on research and analysis to inform the direction of the campaign. The campaign leaders took pride in sticking to the big decisions that they created. At times of disagreements, team members stayed in session until the issue was resolved. |
| **Communication among Coalition Members** | Internal communication strategies focused on a consistent, common message. The campaign was well-served by its ability to deconstruct the complex ballot measure, identify political and legal errors, and share those findings in a few concrete messages. |
| **Ballot Development** | The No campaign spent about $4 million. Anticipation of a win stopped the need to fundraise up to the intended goal of $5 million. In comparison, the Yes campaign spent $902,970.30. The No campaign gained early commitments and consciously shared successes and progress with funders throughout the campaign. Public opinion polling continued throughout the campaign to assess the need for strategic decisions, such as campaign messaging. No on 69 successfully fundraised early and secured commitments, but leaders found it challenging to incentivize funders when it appeared they would win. Funding was problematic later on when it appeared the No campaign would succeed. Funders assumed, “Of course that’s [not] going to pass.” At about the same time, the campaign reduced its budget. It is unclear from the data we gathered if this happened simultaneously or if the lack of available funds forced the campaign to reduce its budget. |

---

### In-Kind Contributions

*Time and support were the two major in-kind contributions required of committee members.* The executive committee put in time and funds, while the steering committee spread the message and shared support.

### High- and Low-Value Spends

*The No on 69 campaign spent money on aspects of the campaign that leaders knew would improve the campaign’s viability and ability to defeat the Yes campaign. According to interviewees, most of the campaign money went to TV ads and coalition building.*

### Leveraged Optimal Actions

#### Campaign Messaging

*The No on 69 campaign created and followed a disciplined strategy that clearly and simply articulated the campaign’s message.* These messages were grounded in the data and targeted toward specific voter groups. The No campaign developed its messaging framework using the Amendment 69: ColoradoCare ballot language, along with public polling and research, to understand the policy issue. The messaging strategy included three overarching messages that needed to be communicated, but constituents were free to modify their messages to target audiences outside the framework. Another key aspect of the No on 69 messaging strategy was their clearly articulated message, used in a repeated and creative manner, which stood out from the typical campaign-related ads. According to interviewees, the No on 69 ads were lighthearted and focused on the key points from the ballot measure.

#### Grassroots Involvement

*The No on 69 campaign had limited involvement from grassroots organizations and more involvement from grasstops organizations.* Yet, the grassroots organizations that were involved provided a value-add to the campaign. According to interviewees, there needs to be a reason for grassroots groups to become involved in a ballot measure: either financial or mission alignment. If the campaign had included more grassroots organizations, it could have leveraged the network and communication channels of the few grassroots organizations to support outreach rather than building its own grassroots network from scratch.

### Implementation

*Because No on 69 was an opposition campaign, it did not require implementation after it passed.*
### Influencing Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The campaign carefully built its strategy, fully recognizing the looming threat of enthusiastic Democratic campaigns suddenly stepping in to support the Yes on 69 campaigns.</em> The campaign constantly navigated the inevitable sense that Hillary Clinton would win the election and that, from a national perspective, the United States would move in the direction of universal health care coverage and access. There was uncertainty whether the proponents, who lacked resources and organization early on, would get an infusion of funds from the Democratic National Committee or Sen. Bernie Sanders’ campaign.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>While the opposition was discussed in passing, it was not a key story for interviewees.</em> See below for the Yes on 69 campaign story.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Yes on 69 (1 interviewee)

We were only able to complete one interview from individuals involved in the ColoradoCare Yes campaign. Below is a summary of the ballot process from the proponent’s perspective. As the data were limited, this section is not ranked.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballot Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| *Discussions about universal health care in Colorado began in 2011, initiated by a group interested in the topic.* A Colorado senator, working with the group in 2011, proposed a ballot measure focused on universal health care in 2012, which didn’t make it out of committee. Following this legislative attempt, the senator, legislative house staff and interested individuals regrouped and began researching and drafting the proposal for ColoradoCare.  

The Yes campaign consciously brought on technical expertise to draft a ballot measure, including a legal expert who helped with research and drafting language. For example, this legal expert swayed the group away from including “do-good language” that didn’t carry meaning.  

The ballot measure was intentionally written with few details, a strategy expected to aid its implementation but instead exposed it to ample criticism from the opposition. The initial group decided to draft a simple proposal, including only very basic structures related to universal health care as stated in the Affordable Care Act, allowing the governing board of what became ColoradoCare to have decision-making power over which health services to include. The opposition successfully promoted the measure’s simplicity as a sign that the ballot was weak and not thought through.  

Given their experience with the ballot measure in the 2012 legislature, the initial group decided to present the measure to the public through a constitutional ballot measure. According to the interviewee, the group was hesitant to push it through as a statutory measure because the legislature and special interest groups would tamper with it. |
### Governance

**The Yes on 69 campaign structure had two levels:**
- Steering committee: This committee was a smaller group of individuals who made all of the decisions. According to the interviewee, the steering committee lacked diversity as it was made up of mostly older White individuals.
- Coordinating team: This group of hardcore volunteers acted as a sounding board and a means of communicating with the other volunteer organizations around Colorado.

The campaign also hired a campaign coordinator, communications director, public relations consultant and social media consultant to support day-to-day operations.

The Yes on 69 campaign had a large number of dedicated volunteers, but these numbers weren’t large enough to overcome the amount of money needed to defend against the opposition. According to the interviewee, the campaign was able to gather and maintain its volunteer base because there were a lot of people in metro Denver and metro Boulder who felt strongly about universal health care. These volunteers gathered signatures and continued to support the campaign to Election Day.

### Funding

**The campaign struggled to attract and secure national funding from progressives around the country.** According to the interviewee, the “logical supporters” of the campaign never got on board with ColoradoCare, either because they didn’t believe the timing was right or that universal health care could not be passed on a state-by-state basis. A major upset came when funding for ColoradoCare failed to materialize, even after Sen. Sanders had endorsed it.

### Leveraged Optimal Actions

**Campaign Messaging: The interviewee had limited involvement with campaign messaging.** Upon reflection, the interviewee believed the Yes on 69 campaign spread its message through small TV ads and op-eds.

According to the interviewee, the most important successes of the campaign were its ability to start the conversation about bringing universal health care to Colorado and to identify the problem with the current health care system. However, the Yes on 69 campaign was limited in its ability to get the message out due to limited funding.

Grassroots Involvement: The Yes on 69 campaign had a good volunteer base, which stayed dedicated and interested throughout signature collection and election campaign periods. The campaign’s strong volunteer base allowed the campaign to collect the number of signatures needed to get the proposal on the ballot.

### Implementation

**Because the Yes on 69 campaign failed to pass, no implementation was necessary.**

### Influencing Factors

**Presidential Year: The campaign constantly competed for resources and attention with all levels of the 2016 election.**

Opposition: According to the interviewee, the opposition significantly outspent the Yes on 69 campaign. Apart from the financial disparity, the opposition was also able to land crucial endorsements from state representatives, legislators and progressive organizations.
Boulder Sugary Drink Tax 2H

Proposed a 2 cent per ounce excise tax on the distribution of beverages with at least 5 grams of added caloric sweeteners per 12 fluid ounces within the City of Boulder. Revenue from the sugary drink tax would be used to improve health equity in Boulder through the support of health promotion, general wellness programs and chronic disease prevention.

Outcome: Passed
Level: Local
Yes Vote: 32,767 (53.90%)
No Vote: 28,021 (46.10%)\(^6\)

Takeaway (4 Interviewees, All Yes)
The pro campaign excelled at leveraging national funds and staying focused on its campaign message. These strengths helped overcome major external opposition, and voters approved the measure. However, the implemented policy is vulnerable to future changes by the Boulder City Council, and the campaign did not build an inclusive governance structure or a strong volunteer base.

### Ballot Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>The Boulder Sugary Drink measure proposed raising taxes and, under TABOR(^7), required a vote through a ballot measure. Boulder’s City Council unanimously voted for the Boulder Sugar Tax and qualified the policy for ballot by referred measure.(^8) Early in the campaign, when one organization agreed to come on board, the organization’s representatives suggested developing a ballot measure through a citizen-led initiative. They were not confident that the Boulder City Council would vote in favor of the measure, and they wanted to have more control over the policy associated with the measure. Thus, the campaign moved forward with the ballot measure by collecting signatures to submit for qualification to the ballot. The Boulder Sugar Tax was the first of its kind for Boulder County, and according to interviewees, there was some confusion about the ballot measure process. Despite the campaign submitting signatures, the Boulder City Council voted on the policy and qualified it as a referred measure.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---


### Development

*The community conceived of the idea for the ballot measure with two community-focused goals in mind, and the measure language addressed these two community goals.* A formal community group in Boulder, made up of health professionals, medical professionals and nonprofits, noticed the effects of sugary drink consumption on the local community. Group members were interested in assessing a sugar-sweetened beverage tax to address the health issues observed. The ballot measure addressed the group’s two main concerns: (1) to disincentivize people from drinking sugary drinks, especially children (2) to raise money for programs to help Boulder community children access healthy foods and activities. Even though the ballot language addressed the concerns of the community, the newness of the policy behind the ballot measure delayed the developmental process because very little data existed to support the policy and the changes proposed. For example, how much money the ballot measure would generate remained unknown. Thus, the campaign took time to discuss the language and tax changes included in the ballot measure.

During ballot development, the Boulder Sugary Drink Tax campaign faced two challenges that threatened its viability. First, the ballot measure was vulnerable to legal resistance by the beverage industry. According to interviewees, it is common practice for the beverage industry to find legal challenges against the language of a ballot measure and pursue legal action to delay a campaign. The campaign spent resources — both money and expertise — to fight and overcome these legal challenges, posed by a well-resourced opposition. Additionally, because the measure was a pioneer policy effort, it was vulnerable to legal complications with the Boulder City Attorney’s Office, which the campaign was still addressing at the time of these interviews. In a nutshell, the Boulder City Attorney’s office was concerned that the language was not legal under the laws of TABOR. These concerns opened the door to the beverage industry opposition and forced the campaign to pass a ballot measure susceptible to change by the City Council. The campaign did not respond to this challenge during ballot measure development, as the campaign team was already committing resources to fight the opposition for getting their measure on the ballot.

### Timing

*The ballot development could have benefited from an earlier start time to discuss and “button up” the policy language before submitting it to the title board.* The committee did not agree on the policy behind the measure early in the process, and that led to disagreements that eventually delayed the ballot measure submission.

The ballot’s approval was delayed due to legal questions posed by the opposition regarding its language, and this delay temporarily sidelined the campaign. When legal questions arose around the language of the ballot measure, the campaign could do little other than prepare for the next stage and employ legal counsel to fight for the ballot measure. Boulder’s City Council did not clear the ballot measure’s language until the day before it was legally required to do so.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Structure** | *The campaign structured itself into two entities: one that centralized power and one that connected to the community it represented.* These two entities worked toward the same goals, and the two campaign staff teams facilitated dialogue between the following two entities:  
- Executive committee was Denver-based and composed of a few large advocacy organizations (which contributed financially) and the communications firm that met weekly.  
- Boulder volunteer coalition offered in-kind, grassroots support. |

| **Functioning** | *Key day-to-day decisions were managed by the organization, which led the executive committee.* The organization delegated tasks to staff and campaign managers. The capacity and political expertise of this organization aided the campaign. This ranged from knowledge of how to prioritize tactics, to fundraising ability, to benefiting from strong, existing relationships with vendors. The campaign relied on technical experts for all functional tasks, but key strategic and tactical decisions were made by this organization, along with some guidance from the larger executive committee.  

The campaign struggled to bridge the divide between the executive committee and the Boulder volunteer coalition. The knowledge and expectation differences between the executive committee and the Boulder volunteer coalition separated the two entities. The executive committee knew what it took to win and focused exclusively on those priorities. The volunteer coalition cared about the journey and building advocacy skills.  

Turnover of campaign managers, as well as the lack of a consistent go-between, reduced some of the Boulder volunteer coalition’s trust. One interviewee attributed the change in campaign managers, in part, to their lack of experience and the difficulty of aligning the needs between the executive committee and the Boulder volunteer coalition. Another interviewee reported that the change in campaign managers brought different hierarchical expectations, in one case shifting from a culture of consulting with volunteers to one of telling the volunteers what to do, which resulted in some loss of the Boulder volunteer coalition’s trust in the executive committee. |

| **Representativeness and Inclusiveness** | *The campaign successfully included a nationally focused executive committee and a local ground game, but it is unclear how much the Boulder volunteer coalition’s input was valued.* The executive committee prioritized responding to the voices of funders and poll responses over expanding or building the ground game. |
## Decision-Making/Role

*Those involved in the executive committee understood their roles, and why decisions were made, while members of the Boulder volunteer coalition lacked clarity on their role, as well as how and why decisions were made.*

A lead organization, with the approval of the executive committee, led decisions related to strategy and money. Campaign managers were tasked with sharing the executive committee’s decisions with the Boulder volunteer coalition, sometimes asking for feedback. Still, one interviewee expressed that the volunteer coalition was unsure how decisions were being made or whether their input was valued. This interviewee reported that this perceived lack of inclusion reduced some local Boulderites’ confidence in the ballot measure. Specifically, the reported concern was that even if the campaign passed, the ballot measure’s purpose would be watered down over time because future exemptions would occur.

## Communication among Coalition Members

*Communication happened, but did not fully bridge the different values and priorities between the executive committee and the Boulder volunteer coalition.* Structures existed to facilitate communication and decisions were shared, but the lack of a two-directional dialogue reduced trust among Boulder volunteer coalition members. The volunteer coalition wanted more inclusion and direction, while the executive committee said the local coalition did not commit or dedicate the time needed for the success of the campaign.

## Funding

### Fundraising and Infusions

*The executive committee tapped into national organizations to raise the substantial amount of funds (totaling $832,496) required to overcome opposition (which raised $945,081).*

Generally, the lead organization raised the funds and put together proposals for how to spend those funds, the campaign manager shared those proposals with the volunteers in Boulder, and then the lead organization and the campaign manager decided how to proceed.

Funds for the campaign increased over the course of the campaign. Early on, the campaign relied on executive committee contributions to get the campaign off the ground. When legal challenges were posed, the lead organization paid the very necessary legal fees. Investors would not support the campaign until after the ballot measure language was approved. Later, infusions of funds helped the campaign maintain momentum. However, one interviewee lamented that had the campaign received an earlier infusion of funds, it could have reached even more people.

### In-Kind Contributions

*Cash was valued over in-kind resources in this campaign. In-kind resources were not a mechanism used as criteria for involvement in the executive committee.* The Boulder volunteer coalition provided in-kind resources.

---

### High- and Low-Value Spends

*The campaign spent money to develop a strong outreach campaign for communicating with diverse voter groups.* The campaign spent money on multiple outreach methods, including paid social media (e.g., Facebook ads), direct mail and digital media (e.g., Pandora). The campaign identified its digital strategy as one of the most effective of the campaign because it allowed the campaign to focus on a narrow group of voters for a low dollar amount. Campaign money was also spent on outdated media methods (e.g., mail or print media) to engage younger voters and appease committee members. But these methods were unable to reach the intended target audiences.

### Leveraged Optimal Actions

**Campaign Messaging**

*The campaign created messages based on input from the community and clearly communicated those messages through multiple media outlets.* The campaign crafted messages that they knew would appeal to the Boulder community rather than vilify the opposition. They created messages based on research and public conversation that focused on kids, health and equity, and interviewees identified these messages as critical to the campaign’s success. Once the campaign decided on a messaging strategy, volunteers implemented it through multiple media outlets such as TV, paid social media, paid digital media, print media and mail.

**Grassroots Involvement**

*The campaign did not prioritize volunteer recruitment, management or retention. In a year with competitive resources, the campaign limited its pool of volunteers.* As a result, the campaign had to advocate with paid canvassers. The campaign had a core group of expert volunteers. However, the campaign eventually lost volunteers due to lack of leadership and management from the committee. According to interviewees, if the volunteers are not continuously supported, they will not return and may not be willing to participate if the committee does not make it easy for them. The loss of volunteers at the beginning of the campaign made it harder for the campaign to recruit new volunteers.

The Boulder volunteer coalition did help increase public awareness by writing letters to the editor. Even though the campaign struggled to retain and recruit volunteers, it did have support from multiple local nonprofits and community leaders who wrote letters to the editor. The outward support from these grassroots organizations was important because it helped increase grassroots support and public awareness of the campaign.
### Implementation

*After the Boulder Sugary Drink Tax passed in 2016, the local community group remained active and supported the grassroots implementation of the ballot measure.* A few members from the Boulder volunteer coalition took it upon themselves to continue supporting the implementation of the Boulder Sugary Drink Tax. The full committee handed over the rights to the campaign’s social media channels to remaining members of the volunteer coalition to continue grassroots support and ensure the measure was implemented as originally written.

Once the community started to implement the sugar tax, it became apparent that the ballot measure language had been too flexible and easy for local entities to file exemptions to the measure. According to interviewees, the campaign was forced to submit a ballot measure that could be easily changed by the Boulder City Council and, as anticipated, local businesses and entities filed exemptions with the Boulder City Council once the ballot measure passed. In response to these exemptions, the campaign had to legally fight to have the measure implemented the way it was originally written.

On the other hand, some of the interviewees believed that the ballot language was too strict, prompting local businesses to file exemptions. According to these interviewees, the campaign should have taken the time to talk with the local business community. They inferred that the campaign compromised on the ballot language to ensure the business community was behind the ballot measure, aiming to avoid challenges once the measure passed.

### Influencing Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The campaign chose to run in an election year, hoping to attract the young vote and overcome the resource limitations of an election year. The choice to run in an election year was strategically advantageous, as research showed young voters were more likely to support a sugar tax and were more likely to vote during a presidential election. The campaign successfully overcame two major resource limitations, which resulted from running a campaign in an election year:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limited number of volunteers to cover the ground, requiring more paid canvassers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limited donations from local funders, requiring alternative fundraising strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Opposition

**The campaign managed to overcome legal action mounted by early opposition aiming to stop the approval of the measure for the ballot, but the resulting fight delayed the campaign and made it easier to challenge in the future.** When the ballot measure was submitted for approval, the beverage industry immediately filed legal challenges against the petition to get it rejected (a standard practice in ballot measure opposition campaigns). At the same time, the City Council’s attorney was challenging the language of the measure, arguing that it was not aligned with TABOR. Two interviewees said the challenge was due to inexperience (this was Boulder’s first citizens’ initiative tax), and one interviewee said there was personal bias against the tax. The campaign realized it could not fight both battles and win, so it gave up the fight with the City Council’s attorney and focused on the opposition campaign. The ballot was approved, but the resulting language made the measure dependent on a City Council ordinance, which makes the language easily subjected to change by the City Council.

The campaign succeeded against an active opposition. The opposition campaigned throughout the election season with the inaccurate slogan, “No on 2H: Stop the Beverage and Grocery Tax” (the tax did not affect groceries, only sugary drinks).
Amendment 72: Tobacco Tax

Proposed increasing the tobacco tax per pack of 20 cigarettes by $1.75 (bringing the total tax to $2.59 per pack) and the tobacco tax for other tobacco products to 22 percent of the manufacturer’s list price (excluding e-cigarettes).

| Reason | Past research and ballot measures have demonstrated effective policy interventions for reducing the consumption of tobacco products. Since the Amendment 72: Tobacco Tax ballot measure involved raising taxes, it was required to go through a vote of the people. Research demonstrates that tax increases positively correlate with smoking cessation. Since a tax increase requires a ballot measure, the biggest decision for the campaign was whether it should be a petition or referred measure. The campaign decided to propose a ballot measure by petition because there was not a lot of political will at the state Capitol for a referred measure. |

Outcome: Failed  Yes Vote: 1,286,851 (46.94%)  
Level: State  No Vote: 1,454,342 (53.06%)  

Takeaway (4 Interviewees, All Yes)

The campaign was unprepared for the strength of the opposition from “Big Tobacco.” In fact, campaign leaders expected a win and set up their structures accordingly. The campaign did not build a broad enough base, nor did it set up the infrastructure to facilitate communication and buy-in among the broader coalition, given the size of the opposition. As a result, the campaign had limited coalition support when “Big Tobacco” ran the second most expensive campaign in Colorado history. As the campaign’s impending failure approached, financial commitments were lost.

Major Pro Financial Supporters
- American Heart Association
- University Physicians, Inc.
- University of Colorado Health
- Children’s Hospital Association
- Healthier Colorado

Major Opposition Financial Supporters
- Altria Group
- McLane Company
- International Premium Cigar & Pipe Retailers Association

https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/resultsData.html?menuheaders=5
### Development

**The campaign developed the ballot language using past research and public polling.** The campaign hired a policy researcher, who provided a document with all the activities completed in the successful 2004 tobacco tax ballot measure. Interviewees said that this document, along with the polling research, was helpful in guiding the conversation among committee members about determining the amount of the tax increase. The time spent on the ballot development was useful. The committee was able to gather opinions from many of the stakeholders and the public, and compromise on ballot language that was representative of the steering committee.

**The campaign’s lack of transparency about the amount of the tax increase and the distribution of revenue influenced fundraising.** According to interviewees, some committee members’ financial commitments were contingent on the policy and where the increased revenue would be invested. Interviewees admitted they did not have the most transparent and timely communication with potential funders during the ballot development phase, which may have led to unfulfilled financial commitments.

### Timing

**The campaign had early support and an unobstructed road to the ballot.**

### Governance

#### Structure

**The campaign had two levels of coalition members: the steering committee (the decision makers) and the broader group of supporters:**

- Steering committee: The pay-to-play group made all the decisions. Inclusion prioritized those committed to raising funds or writing checks, and different anti-tobacco groups.
- Broader coalition: This coalition provided broad level support and was committed to supporting the message.

**The campaign intentionally downsized from a larger group of 14 organizations involved in the policy development stage to six involved in the steering committee.** The original group of 14 included organizations excited to help develop the ballot measure, but not all were ready to devote the time and capacity needed to be involved in the longer-termed steering committee. Before downsizing, the group of 14 hired a campaign manager.

#### Functioning

**The campaign’s structure and capacity were built off of past success and were not sufficient to meet the opposition.** Bolstered by a 70 percent approval rating in the early polls and on the success of the anti-tobacco ballot measure in 2004, the campaign expected to sail through. In reality, “Big Tobacco” decided to target this campaign as one of its national strategies in 2016. The campaign did not have the fundraising or the strategic expertise to overcome the force of the opposition.
### Representativeness and Inclusiveness

*While the campaign consciously included a diverse anti-tobacco group, it did not take enough time to ensure that all the right people were involved.*

The steering committee and the broader coalition included public health entities, disease groups, tobacco control groups and, for the first time in Colorado’s anti-tobacco movement, a veterans group. In retrospect, and given the size of the opposition, interviewees wished more time had been taken to increase the number involved and broaden the stakeholder group through a longer participatory vetting process.

### Decision-Making/ Roles

*The decision-making process and roles centralized power with the steering committee.* This enabled an egalitarian and uncontroversial process for the steering committee to direct the path. Compared to other campaigns, it failed to gather the depth of information that a more cross-coalition decision-making process would have gained. The steering committee members each got one vote for each decision, and the majority vote won for decisions. The broader coalition was not included in decision-making, and there was little discussion with coalition members to solicit feedback.

*In October, when the steering committee realized the campaign was headed toward failure, two of the leading organizations stepped in and took over day-to-day management.* Initially, day-to-day campaign operations were managed by the campaign manager and paid staff, who shared the information with the steering committee. The campaign manager presented ideas to the steering committee, whose members determined whether the ideas should be pursued. In October, the steering committee took over tactical and campaign messaging decisions given inadequate resources.

### Communication among Coalition Members

*The campaign strategically chose to limit information sharing with the broader coalition, a tactic that limited broad coalition buy-in and backfired when the opposition campaign ramped up.* One interviewee reported that the campaign chose not to overwhelm the broader coalition with information. But this approach — not creating the infrastructure to communicate with the broader coalition and then under communicating with these members — backfired, and the steering committee did not have an attentive audience when needed.
### Funding

| Fundraising and Infusions | **Fundraising was a challenge. The campaign raised more funding before the ballot measure was created, and the flow of funds decreased as the campaign neared Election Day.** Some non-lobbying dollars were raised early on, but after the ballot measure was created, funds trickled in. The campaign struggled the most at the end of the campaign. The financial resources invested by those involved were limited. Two major theories from interviewees follow:  
• Lack of capacity and willingness of many steering committee members to prioritize fundraising for this campaign issue over their own health organizations.  
• Lack of urgency due to the previous success, creating a sense of complacency that reduced enthusiasm.  
Later in the campaign, in the face of the opposition’s growing strength, two significant commitments were not fulfilled, which further limited the campaign’s financial resources and reduced morale. In the last four weeks of the campaign, there was “basically no funding.” |
| In-Kind Contributions | **The steering committee’s leaders committed significant in-kind resources, but the campaign was not set up to harvest in-kind resources beyond the steering committee.** The steering committee’s in-kind contributions included dedicated time, resources and willingness to fundraise for the campaign. For example, from November 2015 to April 2016, the steering committee met for four hours almost every week. |
| High- and Low-Value Spends | **The campaign had to make well thought out spends during all stages of the ballot measure process to avoid overspending and unnecessary spending. Interviewees said the most effective spends were TV and mail ads, the website, signature collecting, the campaign manager and canvassers.** Paid media was the most important spend during the process. Interviewees reported that they only spent money on high-value activities because their budget was so tight. |
### Leveraged Optimal Actions

| Campaign Messaging | Despite its strict budget, the campaign used multiple media to spread the campaign message and reach a wide range of voters. However, the campaign messages did not reach the public in time to effectively change the minds of swing and no voters. According to interviewees, campaign leaders realized after collecting signatures that they needed to start targeting communications to swing voters through print, radio, TV, phone banking, public speakers, social media and digital ads. For example, the campaign trained community leaders and volunteers to speak to the media and chambers of commerce about the ballot measure. Interviewees said that strong campaign messaging and communication are expensive, and given the strict budget of the campaign, they were forced to “go dark on paid media” for the last two weeks, ultimately contributing to the campaign’s defeat. According to interviewees, if they could have spent more money on earned media, the campaign might have had a higher chance of victory.

**Disciplined, yet responsive campaign messaging positively influenced the public’s perception of the measure, but not enough for the campaign to succeed.** The campaign employed a disciplined, yet flexible messaging strategy. Interviewees said that at the beginning of the campaign, they pushed messages that positively promoted the ballot measure through their local organizations and health centers. Near the end of the campaign, they shifted their messaging strategy to negative promotion of “Big Tobacco.” Negative promotion of the opposition resonated with people, making it positive promotion of the ballot measure. However, despite these efforts, the campaign was not able to spread its message to the necessary voters before running out of money. |
| Grassroots Involvement | Interviewees believed that grassroots support is nice to have during the ballot measure process. However, this was not a key story of the interviewees. |
| Implementation | This ballot measure failed; no implementation was required. |
## Influencing Factors

| Presidential Year | The overcrowded 2016 ballot posed significant resource limitations, which compounded the financial challenges faced by the campaign. The campaign consciously chose to run in 2016 because it was a presidential election year and because a different ballot measure, Amendment 71, would make it harder to run ballots in the future. As many other ballot measures ran in 2016, challenges included the following:  
| | • Similar messages across campaigns reduced the effectiveness of any one message.  
| | • Public preoccupation with the presidential election in a swing state reduced the attention given to ballot measures.  
| | • Number of campaigns divided the pool of funders’ resources.  
| Opposition | “Big Tobacco” changed the nature of this campaign. It targeted this campaign as a priority and outraised funds 7-to-1, raising over $18 million and making it the second most expensive ballot effort in Colorado state history.11 “Big Tobacco” used these extensive funds to blanket the media. One interviewee reported that the opposition bought off some of the well-known figures on the left to speak out against the measure, which really caused some people to pause and consider if they wished to support the measure. 

---

11The No campaign, run by “Big Tobacco,” was the second most expensive ballot effort in Colorado state history (https://www.denverite.com/amendment-72-raising-taxes-cigarettes-20409/), outspent only by the casino interest groups in 2014, which spent $20 million to defeat Amendment 68, a measure that would have expanded casino-type gambling to horse racing tracks.
Larimer County Behavioral Health Tax Issue 1A

Proposed a 0.25 percent sales tax in Larimer County for 25 years to fund the purchase of land and construction of a 51,000-square-foot behavioral health facility to provide acute treatment, substance abuse detox and treatment, and intensive residential treatment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Pro Financial Supporters</th>
<th>Major Opposition Financial Supporters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaiser Permanente</td>
<td>No formal opposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Takeaway (4 Interviewees, All Yes)

From the beginning, the campaign struggled to make strategic decisions that would have promoted success. The limited use of strategy created challenges. Two key examples were that the governance structure did not leverage financial and in-kind capital from members, or develop an effective campaign message and communication strategy. Without capital and a strong campaign message, the campaign was unable to build a strong fundraising initiative, hire the necessary technical experts or spread its message to the swing voters.

Ballot Development

Reason

*Government officials supported the issue, and referred it to the ballot.* The Larimer County Commissioners recognized that behavioral health and treatment have been gaps in the community for years. Larimer County tried to pass a similar ballot in 2008 and in 2012, but those measures failed. Given the gap in the community, the county commissioners made the behavioral health gap one of its five-year priorities and decided that a ballot measure would be the most expedient method to address the gap. Additionally, the ballot measure proposed a tax increase and under TABOR required a vote of the people.

Development

*Decades of conversation and past ballot measures fueled the ballot measure development in 2016.* A group from Fort Collins, made up of people with experience in behavioral health and/or substance abuse issues, had been working on policy changes related to behavioral health in Larimer County for more than 17 years. This group proposed at least two ballot measures that failed in 2008 and 2012. The historical knowledge from this group, along with public polling, helped craft the policy proposed in the 2016 ballot measure. Interviewees said that the thoughts and feelings of the campaign were well-represented in the policy proposed in the ballot measure.

Timing

*The timing of the ballot development was not a main takeaway from our conversations with campaign members.*
### Governance

#### Structure

*Operationally, this campaign functioned through one committee, an advisory board, even though a broader coalition existed.* Within the advisory board, decisions were really made by a discussion between the co-chairs, a county office representative and the campaign manager, who reported decisions to the rest of the advisory board:

- **Advisory board:** The advisory board included six to 12 members who were primarily retirees, including two retired local politicians who were co-chairs. The board met every other week to review decisions.
- **Broader coalition:** It is unclear how this group contributed to the campaign. One organization, Kaiser Permanente, provided some funding, but was not otherwise involved. The group only met a few times.

Participation on the advisory board did not require a vetting process based on willingness to dedicate time or raise resources. Most of the members were tagged by the county commissioners and/or had a personal passion for addressing behavioral health issues. One interviewee said that this campaign did not strategically recruit advisory board members, but recruitment was instead driven by connections to the commissioners, co-chairs or interest. Another interviewee expressed frustration that emotion, rather than reason, ruled many on the advisory board. Strategic decisions that could have set up the campaign for success did not happen. For example, the campaign lacked a vetting process to consciously bring needed skills and resources onto the advisory board, as well as an effort to actively build a structure and broader coalition to meet the needs of the campaign.

#### Functioning

*Larimer County Behavioral Health Tax 1A heavily relied on the support of three county commissioners for much of its progress.* The county commissioners set up the coalition and appointed the two co-chairs. Additionally, they placed the measure on the ballot, circumventing the campaign’s need to gather signatures or develop a strong campaign language.

Because of limited funds, the campaign only hired a few technical experts. Only a campaign manager and fundraising organization were hired. The campaign manager, after much debate, convinced the campaign to contract a web expert for a short time.

The mostly retired members of the advisory board struggled to value strategies that work better with current times. Most individuals on the advisory board had last run a successful campaign in the 1990s, before the expanded use of the internet. The campaign manager and advisory board constantly struggled to agree on the most effective steps for running the campaign. For example, the campaign manager often suggested using social media and other more current methods for advertising the campaign, while the advisory board preferred in-person interactions and billboards.
<p>| Representativeness and Inclusiveness | While the campaign involved those with personal knowledge of the impact of behavioral health issues, few behavioral health professionals or representatives from community organizations, local or county government agencies, or the business community were included. It was noted that elected officials were not willing to be on this advisory board. Mainly, the broader coalition included individuals. One interviewee reported that only two larger, statewide organizations were involved, and they met with the advisory board at least three or four times over the course of the campaign. A lesson learned was the need to include more educated and professional voices in the campaign. Toward the end of the campaign, one behavioral health professional was asked to attend the advisory board meetings, but beyond that, there was no input from those whose work would have been most affected if the ballot had passed. |
| Decision-Making/ Roles | The campaign never approved a decision-making process. According to interviewees, the three decision makers (co-chairs and a county office representative) and the campaign manager often made decisions and then shared them with others. A decision-making process was not formalized, and anytime a process was suggested, the advisory board avoided approving a methodological process. |
| Communication among Coalition Members | Communication was one-directional, which limited opportunities for feedback and vetting ideas, sometimes leading to miscommunication. There was limited discussion among the advisory board members about the best strategies to be used or whether to consider alternative options. Interviewees described their experience as being told about decisions or not engaging in decisions — an unusual state for some who are usually pulled into the process. Misunderstandings arose between external consultants and the advisory board about expectations and processes. As a result, when troubles arose, resentment built on both sides. In one case, the resulting resentment ended in an unfortunate parting of ways. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Fundraising and Infusions | *The advisory board did not want to personally fundraise and instead relied on the professional fundraisers.* Roughly $120,000 was raised, mainly through hired fundraisers. While the amount was low, the pollster told campaign members that the numbers looked positive, and so members did not worry too much about their limited funds.  
  
  *Two key people on the advisory board (the co-chairs) made all the financial decisions and reported them to the rest of the advisory board.* As decisions arose, the campaign manager would propose three options to the advisory board (truly, the subgroup of three) to decide.  
  
  *Funds trickled in, primarily in small amounts ($10 to $100), throughout the campaign.* The only larger infusion of $25,000 came in near the middle of the campaign. According to one interviewee, an earlier, larger influx of funds would have helped the fundraisers leverage some of the other big contributors in the county. |
| In-Kind Contributions   | *The campaign did not use in-kind capacity or resources as a strategy.* Advisory board members were not expected to fundraise over the course of the entire campaign. |
| High- and Low-Value Spends | *The campaign spent money on strategies that fit within its budget, but that might not have matched the needs of the campaign.* According to one interviewee, educating and speaking with the public helped strengthen the support for the campaign. However, the meetings may not have reached the target audiences needed. The campaign also spent money on mailers and brochures that, according to the interviewees, were not effective at reaching a broader audience. The campaign spent money on billboard ads and yard signs, which were also not effective at reaching the needed voters. According to the interviewees, the billboards were in Fort Collins — a liberal city and supportive of the issue. But people from other, less supportive communities barely saw the billboards; thus, the campaign did not reach the audiences it needed to sway. |
**SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED BY BALLOT MEASURE**

### Leveraged Optimal Actions

#### Campaign Messaging

**Ineffective choice of medium to announce campaign.** Due to the campaign’s limited funding, campaign members were unable to make large media buys to spread the campaign message. According to interviewees, the campaign bought four different billboards, which were mainly located in Fort Collins (a liberal city in the county) and lawn signs. On reflection, the interviewees applauded the campaign’s use of public forums to communicate its message directly to people from the county.

Given this limited messaging strategy, the campaign managed to communicate with yes voters, but struggled to effectively reach the swing and no voters. Upon reflection, the interviewees admitted that their message was communicated to those who supported the policy issue or were impacted by behavioral health issues, either personally or through loved ones. But the campaign had not spread its messages to the swing voters or more conservative parts of the county.

The campaign debated about proper language to use during the ballot measure's campaign. According to interviewees, some members of the advisory board were hesitant to use the word “detox” when talking about the treatment of substance abuse because it might remind voters that they would be taking care of drug addicts and alcoholics. However, the campaign’s polling data showed that the public understood what “detox” meant over the medical jargon for the disease.

#### Grassroots Involvement

**The campaign discovered that incorporating the voices of the people affected by the ballot measure and/or behavioral health issues crafted powerful messages and increased support for the campaign.** Involving community members in the campaign helped communicate the effects of behavioral health and substance abuse issues to the public and put a true face to the issue. This grassroots involvement helped increase voter support and even generated more interest from community members who wanted to be the campaign’s voice. However, the community leaders were only able to communicate to a small portion of the voters, most of whom already supported the ballot measure.

#### Implementation

**Although the ballot measure failed to pass in 2016, discussions about future policy efforts began almost immediately after the measure’s failure.** According to interviewees, discussions were taking place about a new initiative to address the behavioral health and substance abuse issues in Larimer County, particularly from the faith community. This issue is important to the Larimer County community. Efforts to address the issue have been developing for many years, and the community is motivated to find a solution.
### Influencing Factors

| Presidential Year | The campaign failed to make itself competitively appealing during an election year, which was overcrowded with measures asking for tax increases for public services. Other ballot measures expecting to increase funds included the school district, an arts district and a hospital. One interviewee said that the large oppositional campaigns to state-level ballots related to health care, specifically universal health care, and using tobacco taxes for behavioral health services reduced voters’ willingness to support this local level ballot.

The rallying of Donald Trump supporters and their anti-taxes or social services mindset hurt the campaign’s public education and Election Day success. Reportedly, at some of the public education rallies, local residents vocally expressed anger about supporting social services and stigmatized those needing behavioral health support. Because of Donald Trump’s messages, 2016 was a particularly hard election year to rally support for a behavioral health facility.

In the end, the campaign lost by four points and only won in Estes Park and in Fort Collins. While advisory board members considered the four-point loss very close, campaign members were heartbroken that Loveland (a more progressive part of the county) did not approve the ballot measure. |
| Opposition | There was no organized opposition. |
Colorado Priorities Fiscal Reform

Proposed allowing the state to keep any revenue over the TABOR cap until 2026.

Outcome: Stopped collecting signatures; ballot measure not submitted to the secretary of state
Level: State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Pro Financial Supporters</th>
<th>Major Opposition Financial Supporters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information not available through Ballotpedia</td>
<td>Information not available through Ballotpedia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Takeaway (3 Interviewees, All Yes)**

The campaign aimed to build a broad base, representing Republicans and Democrats, business and private sector interests and public and nonprofit interests. Yet, the decision-making process favored the well-resourced, which limited the breadth of ideas and grassroots supporters involved in the campaign. Believing a loss was likely, the co-chairs stopped the campaign a month before they were required to hand in their signatures. Some participants in the effort believed that a substantial loss would have set this type of campaign back. This diverse group is unlikely to present a united front on similar policy issues in the future. The governance structure was not inclusive, resulting in poor relationships.

**Ballot Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colorado Priorities Fiscal Reform proposed a statutory modification to how the state approaches revenue exceeding the TABOR cap. The Colorado Constitution sets a cap on state revenue growth. When state revenue collections exceed the cap, a vote of the people is required to authorize the retention and use of those funds collected in excess of the cap. The ballot measure proposed did not generate more revenue by raising taxes, but instead allowed the state to keep the revenue already generated and allocate it among top priorities for Colorado, as identified by Coloradans.</td>
<td>Two groups, one made up of multiple organizations and the other a single organization, reluctantly came together to form a single campaign. Both groups were working on similar policy proposals and decided that their campaign and ballot measure would benefit from their cooperation rather than their competition. The Colorado Priorities campaign formed in early 2016 and was committed to developing bipartisan support to make the policy issue less partisan and controversial. After the campaigns merged, members discussed the content and language of the ballot measure. Interviewees said they would have liked to have seen some changes in the final ballot language submitted because they worried that the ballot measure might only appeal to a narrow band of Coloradans. Despite this hesitation, the interviewees said the ballot language submitted represented both the thoughts of the campaign and progress for Colorado.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/results/2015-2016/117Results.html
### Timing

*The Colorado Priorities campaign delayed submitting its measure to the title board multiple times, complicating essential actions needed for a successful ballot measure.* In 2015, two groups were gathering opinions from the public about priorities in Colorado that need to be addressed. The two groups merged in early 2016 to form the Colorado Priorities campaign. While public opinion work was underway for both groups, as early as mid-2015, the newly hired campaign manager wanted new polling and focus groups in 2016, which delayed submission of the measure multiple times. The additional public opinion work, focused mostly on potential messaging, significantly delayed the timing of submitting the measure for title setting. The delay in submitting the measure complicated fundraising and made it difficult to launch a comprehensive signature-gathering campaign that could include a robust volunteer component. The delays and complications ultimately led to the campaign’s decision to pull the ballot measure in July 2016.

### Influencing Factors

#### Structure

*While the campaign officially had two levels, in reality, there were three levels: a core of three on the executive committee who made decisions; the rest of the executive committee, who reflected on those decisions; and the broader coalition.*

- **Executive committee:** The executive committee was made up of about 20 people and organizations. Representatives were committed to fundraise and build public awareness; they included:
  - A more business-minded group (about eight organizations)
  - A more progressive group (two organizations)
  - Hired consultants (eight to 10 people)
- **Broader coalition:** The broader coalition included other organizations interested in the campaign.

#### Functioning

*This campaign relied heavily on consultants whose power spread to the co-chairs. Very limited power was distributed among other coalition members.* Two interviewees reported that from all of their experiences working on campaigns, this campaign had the most centralized power in the hands of a few. It is unclear exactly who held the reins; one interviewee said power was in the hands of the consultants; another interviewee said the co-chairs chose to listen to the consultants and did not actively distribute power. The campaign manager was hired by the co-chairs before the executive committee was formed, a primary driver of the centralization of power.
### Representativeness and Inclusiveness

Knowing Colorado’s cultural reticence to allowing the government to distribute tax revenue, the campaign dedicated a lot of effort to building a strong bipartisan group. One group ensured business-minded support for a tax to increase statewide services, and the campaign actively sought out Republican voices to join the coalition. Another group agreed to merge its already existing campaign with the more business-aligned group, in part, to gather Republican support.

While bipartisan in makeup, in practice, the campaign was not inclusive. According to two interviewees, the campaign managers excluded all but the co-chairs. One interviewee noted that these consultants were not open to suggestions from the executive committee members, and that these same consultants did not inform the co-chairs adequately about their processes. Another interviewee said that the campaign’s structure most favored all decisions, ideas and support toward those with the most resources, leaving other executive committee members unsure whether a bipartisan front was worth the cost of compromising and joining the campaign.

### Decision-Making/Roles

The co-chairs and the campaign staff developed the strategies and informed the rest of the executive committee of their decisions. At times, others in the executive committee were charged with actions, like fundraising. However, those invited to the executive committee expected to have more power.

### Communication among Coalition Members

Communication among coalition members was one-directional and top-down from the co-chairs and campaign staff. The decision to stop the campaign is perhaps the clearest evidence of this structure. The campaign manager and the co-chairs had a shared understanding that a loss at the ballot was unacceptable, estimating it would put any similar bills aimed at redistributing taxes toward public services back “15 to 20 years.” It is unclear whether this understanding was communicated to others on the campaign. One interviewee suggested a core communication issue was the philosophical split about whether a loss would harm these efforts at all. It was clear that one-week executive committee members were encouraged to fundraise, and a week later they were told the ballot would be pulled. This decision, like others, was top-down.

It is unclear how well communication existed between the campaign staff and the co-chairs. One interviewee said that compared to leaders in other campaigns running at the same time, the co-chairs were less informed than usual.
SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED BY BALLOT MEASURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising and Infusions</td>
<td>The campaign struggled to fundraise much beyond those who were engaged in the campaign itself. The campaign successfully raised funds, and one interviewee reported that “a million dollars” were spent before the campaign was pulled. Yet, the funds raised mainly came from those directly involved, wealthy individuals and well-resourced organizations. One interviewee said that the delays in finalizing the ballot language significantly contributed to the limited amount of funding raised. The costs for running the campaign were unprecedentedly high. Some of those increases were beyond the control of those directly involved. The cost of collecting signatures increased exponentially, reportedly growing from $1.50 to $3, and then to about $8 to $10 per signature because a different anti-ballot campaign bought out most of the signature gathers. The campaign was ill-prepared for this increase. (Disclaimer: This information comes from a key stakeholder; across all the interviewees, only one interviewee described this phenomenon.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Kind Contributions</td>
<td>In-kind resources were not heavily sought beyond asking for executive committee members to dedicate their time and external networks to help with fundraising.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High- and Low-Value Spends</td>
<td>The campaign hired consultants, but interviewees did not emphasize whether the spends were effective to the overall campaign.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leveraged Optimal Actions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Messaging</td>
<td>The campaign did not complete traditional public outreach activities because it did not qualify for the ballot. According to interviewees, Colorado Priorities developed scripts for the signature gatherers. However, there wasn’t an effort to communicate as a means to collect signatures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Involvement</td>
<td>The eventual campaign recognized the positive influence grassroots support could have on the campaign. Because some organizations realized the power of grassroots support, they included nontraditional community leaders to complete a citizen engagement process. For some interviewees, this was the first time they saw business organizations investing money in nonprofits for grassroots signature gathering during a campaign.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Implementation            | Colorado Priorities failed to make it on the ballot in 2016. |
### Influencing Factors

| Presidential Year | Key stakeholders of the campaign had divergent priorities in the presidential year. The business community, especially, was consumed by its involvement in many different ballot measures (such as Amendment 70: Minimum Wage and Amendment 69: ColoradoCare), which were run because it was a presidential year. Though the stakeholders thought they could do it all, they eventually realized the lack of resources for this campaign's cause. One interviewee said that the expectation of a Democratic presidential win reduced the campaign's incentive to fight for this victory. Campaign members assumed that a progressive government would increase the general climate toward retaining and redistributing tax funds collected and could support a ballot measure campaign in future years. The campaign faced unexpected challenges due to strategies used by a No campaign that was fighting against a different ballot measure. In addition to increasing the costs of employing signature gatherers, one industry’s anti-campaign used tactics that affected other campaigns in 2016. These anti-campaigns used anti-signage language such as “Decline to sign. Read before you sign. Don’t sign at this place. Don’t sign it because somebody asked you to. Make sure that you read the measure thoroughly.” While public awareness is good, it decreased the willingness of the public to support ballot measures. (Disclaimer: This information comes from a key stakeholder; across all the interviewees, only one interviewee described this phenomenon.) |
| Opposition | There was no specific organized opposition. |
Section III: Key Lessons for Advocates and Funders

As part of this evaluation, Vantage was interested in knowing which lessons would be most important for advocates and funders from the many themes presented throughout this report. Those themes were ballot development, governance, funding, campaign messaging, grassroots involvement and implementation. During a convening hosted by the Foundation, we shared the high-level findings and the Ballot Measure Road Map: How to Navigate the Journey with stakeholders, funders and advocates, and asked them to vote on the following question: Based on the journey map and session content, what do you see as key take aways under each theme?

Eighteen stakeholders voted on the following key lessons as most important for advocates to know when working on a ballot measure campaign. Some stakeholders also shared their reasoning for why the takeaway resonated the strongest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Key Takeaway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance (n=5)</td>
<td>Two stakeholders cared about defining <strong>skills and expectations</strong>, with one emphasizing the importance of identifying gaps in skills. One stakeholder emphasized the importance of ensuring <strong>multidirectional communication</strong> and clear mechanisms for this flow of information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot Development (n=5)</td>
<td>Two stakeholders stressed the importance of considering <strong>whether a ballot measure is the right tool for political change.</strong> One noted, “It is expensive and more difficult to initiate than going directly to elected officials.” The other stakeholder asked advocates to consider what it means to lack bipartisanship or legislative will.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Involvement (n=4)</td>
<td>It is <strong>worth the time to leverage broad networks</strong>, as one stakeholder emphasized that ballot measure campaigns “need an array of advocates who work at this level!”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Messaging (n=2)</td>
<td>Targeted messaging that provides <strong>different messages for different demographics</strong> mattered most for one stakeholder. The other stakeholder emphasized the interplay between targeted and tested messaging, stating, “Test, target, test! Target again!”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Implementation (n=2)

Two stakeholders cared most that advocates be aware that **early decisions affect ease of implementation**, especially to defend against oppositional actions. As one said, “*Think about how to ensure good implementation [of] legislations and regulations. Keep out [opposing] agencies from undermining it.*”

### Funding (n=0)

N/A

---

**n** = number of stakeholders.

Nineteen stakeholders voted on the following key lessons as most important for **funders** to know when working on a ballot measure campaign:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Key Takeaway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding (n=7)</td>
<td>The importance of <strong>infusing the funding throughout the campaign</strong> resonated strongly with one stakeholder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance (n=4)</td>
<td>All four stakeholders who voted provided reasons for the importance of governance structure:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure <strong>multidirectional communication</strong>, which includes community members expressing their needs directly to funders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure <strong>effective use of consultants</strong> as funders so that effective research and data support the effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Invest in government structure to ensure success (relating to the findings in <strong>segmented levels of involvement</strong>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Explore how funders could be a part of the governance structure of the ballot measure campaign coalition, and how funders could be a part of the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Involvement (n=3)</td>
<td>As it is <strong>worth the time to leverage broad networks</strong>, the three stakeholders all stressed the need for funders to value the importance of grassroots involvement. As one explained, “Funders already care about testing outcomes. They should care about grassroots efforts because they do the work.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation (n=2)</td>
<td>One stakeholder felt funders need to know it is important that ballot measure campaigns <strong>retain financial and human resources after the election.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot Development (n=2)</td>
<td>None who voted for ballot development provided a supporting reason.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Messaging (n=1)</td>
<td>The one stakeholder who voted for this lesson said that <strong>campaign messages must emphasize the direct benefits of any ballot measure</strong> to the community and state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**n** = number of stakeholders.
The 2016 election cycle was unique because of the amount of local and statewide policy initiatives submitted and accepted to appear on the ballot. According to the Colorado secretary of state, the number of statewide initiatives that were filed but that failed to qualify for the ballot outnumbered those that qualified for the ballot almost 5-to-1 (more than 90 initiatives filed versus nine initiatives accepted). Of the initiatives accepted:

- Six were proposed changes to the constitution and three proposed changes to state statutes;
- Seven were citizen initiatives and two were legislative referrals.

This section also includes a complete listing of municipal election results.

### Citizen Initiatives versus Legislative Referrals

A **citizen initiative** is a proposed statute or constitutional amendment appearing on a ballot because a minimum number of registered voters signed a petition to put before the public.

A **legislative referral** is a proposed constitutional amendment appearing on a ballot because the state legislature or local legislative body voted to put it before the public.

---


### STATEWIDE BALLOT INITIATIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appeared on the Ballot</th>
<th>Failed to Qualify for the Ballot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Amendment T: Involuntary Servitude Prohibition</td>
<td>• Iran-Restricted Company Divestment Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Amendment U: Exempt Interests from Property Taxes</td>
<td>• Income Tax Increase Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Amendment 69: State Health Care System</td>
<td>• Local Control of Oil and Gas Development Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Amendment 70: State Minimum Wage</td>
<td>• Mandatory Setback from Oil and Gas Development Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Amendment 71: Initiated Constitutional Amendments</td>
<td>• Right to a Healthy Environment Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Amendment 72: New Tobacco Taxes</td>
<td>• Recall Procedures Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Proposition 106: Medical Aid in Dying</td>
<td>• Adding Poker to Bingo and Raffles Law Definition Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Proposition 107: Presidential Primary Election</td>
<td>• Voter Approval of Initiated Constitutional Amendments Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Proposition 108: Primary Elections</td>
<td>• Concealed Handgun Permits Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Daylight Saving Time Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Right to Local Self-Government Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• License to Allow Food Stores to Sell Beer and Wine Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Automatic Voter Registration Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fiscal Impact Statements for Initiated Measures Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public Trust Resources Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ban on Fracking Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Judicial Conduct and Jurisdiction of Judicial Discipline Transfer Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Retention of Excess State Revenue Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regulation of the Sale of Marijuana and Marijuana Products Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Minimum Age to Sell Alcohol Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Redistricting Commission Amendment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## MUNICIPAL ELECTION RESULTS[^17]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broadband</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broadband service is lacking in many parts of Colorado and residents went to the polls to authorize their municipality to provide that service either directly or through a third party. Such a vote is required under a 2005 state statute and nine municipalities approved broadband service measures. Akron, Buena Vista, Fruita, Mancos, Orchard City, Pagosa Springs, Silver Cliff, Wellington and Westcliffe join 36 other Colorado municipalities that have previously approved such ballot issues. Every city or town that has placed a broadband issue on the ballot has received approval to provide or contract for the service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colorado now has 101 home rule municipalities after Hudson voters approved a town charter on an 89-50 vote. Home rule is a constitutional provision that allows residents to adopt a charter that grants local control over local and municipal matters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marijuana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Various marijuana taxation measures passed in Blanca, Crestone, Hotchkiss, Poncha Springs, Sedgwick and Silver Cliff. Voters rejected marijuana sales and cultivation ballot issues in Buena Vista, Hotchkiss, Julesburg, Poncha Springs and Silver Cliff. Permission for retail sales was granted in Crestone.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal voters continued a trend of saying “yes” more often than “no” when voting on tax issues. Ballots were cast on a number of tax measures on Election Day:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ault – Rejected a property tax increase for the town’s general fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Berthoud – Approved both a lodger’s tax and a property tax extension supporting law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Carbondale – Said no to both an excise tax on gas and electric bills for a municipal climate plan and a property tax increase for capital improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Collbran – Rejected imposition of a use tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Eagle – Said yes to a sales tax increase for quality of life programs such as open space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kersey – Approved a property tax extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nederland – Approved a ‘de-Brucing’ question to allow use of all tax revenue, but said no to a $3 million debt issue for the town’s Downtown Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pierce – A property tax extension was approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Saguache – Said yes to a sales tax increase to fund law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Silver Cliff – Said no to a property tax increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• South Fork – Rejected a municipal use tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Winter Park – Approved both sales tax and lodger’s tax extensions dedicated to marketing and capital improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Woodland Park – Approved a sales tax increase for the school district</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Parachute voters rejected the recall of the mayor and two town trustees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Creede will allow the use of off-road vehicles on designated city routes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Silver Cliff voters rejected allowing ordinances to be published by title only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section V: Methods

This section presents the protocol used during stakeholder interviews and methods used to analyze feedback from these stakeholders. The purpose of the stakeholder interviews was to learn about:

- Strategic decisions made by the campaign
- Successes and challenges of the campaign
- Lessons learned and best practices to either implement or change in future policy change efforts

RECRUITMENT

Vantage completed 22 interviews from a list of 43 potential interviewees. Using an initial list of 26 interviewees identified by Foundation staff, we employed the snowball sampling method to identify additional interviewees. Some interviewees were invited to participate in the interview process for more than one ballot measure (e.g., the interviewee worked on two ballot measures from our list in 2016). Completed interviewees included stakeholders from the Amendment 69: ColoradoCare (n=4), Amendment 70: Minimum Wage (n=5), Amendment 72: Tobacco Tax (n=4), Boulder Sugary Drink Tax 2H (n=4), Larimer County Behavioral Health Tax Issue 1A (n=3) and Colorado Priorities Fiscal Reform (n=3) campaigns.

INTERVIEW METHOD AND ANALYSIS

We used a semi-structured approach to the interviews and prioritized questions by interviewee role (advocate versus funder).

Interviews lasted from 40 to 60 minutes and were recorded and transcribed verbatim for analysis. To capture the whole story, interviewers took detailed notes during the interview, categorized by high-level concepts, to assist in organizing initial findings and identifying themes throughout this process. The interviewers met weekly and reviewed major findings, rising themes and differences by ballot measure.

Transcribed interviews were coded initially by high-level concepts (ballot, governance, funding, key internal influences and key external influences), and then by a coding structure to capture the more nuanced themes under each high-level concept. Codes were analyzed for themes at the ballot level and included an exploration of patterns across ballot measures.
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

The following protocol was used in stakeholder interviews:

**Background:** Vantage is conducting interviews with individuals involved in various ballot measures from the 2016 election cycle to obtain their perspective on the successes, challenges and impact of the ballot measure they were involved with. Given your background and experience, we would greatly appreciate your time and your participation in these interviews. All the information you share will remain confidential, meaning your name, organization and any identifying characteristics will not be shared in any way. We may report findings by ballot measure. When reporting on the results from the interviews, only anonymous and/or aggregated information will be shared. Neither the information you share nor your choice of whether to participate will have any bearing on current or future grant funding.

**Interview Purpose:** To gather feedback from advocates and funders on the key strategic decisions, challenges and successes throughout the life cycle of the ballot process for each measure. The information gained during the interviews will be used to inform key themes that influenced the difference in outcomes among the 2016 ballot measures and to develop learnings that can inform future ballot efforts.

**Protocol**

Hi, my name is ________. I’m with Vantage Evaluation. We are third-party evaluators working with the Colorado Health Foundation to help it to uncover the full life cycle of each ballot initiative, from the initial coalition to reflections on the ultimate win or loss outcome.

Your participation is voluntary, and you are free to stop the interview at any time. All the information you share with me will remain confidential, meaning your name, organization and any identifying characteristics will not be shared in any way. When reporting on the results from the interviews, only anonymous and/or aggregated information will be shared. Neither the information you share nor your choice of whether to participate will have any bearing on current or future grant funding.

We would like to record this interview to ensure the accuracy of our notes. The information will not be shared with anyone outside Vantage Evaluation. Do I have your permission to record?

This should take about one hour. Do you have any questions for me before we start?
For advocates:

First, I’d like to ask you a few questions about your involvement with [insert appropriate ballot measure].

1. How and why did your organization first become interested in your organization’s role in [insert appropriate policy issue]?
   a. How did you first become involved in the campaign for/against [insert ballot measure name]?
   b. What activities/stages were you most involved in?
   c. Least involved in?
   d. What organizational capacities were necessary for your organization’s role in the campaign?
      i. Reflecting on the campaign, were there capacities you wish either you or your organization had and what were they?

Next, I’d like to ask you about the life cycle of the policy issue.

1. Describe how the campaign identified the issue and then moved to using a ballot measure as the tool/appropriate solution.

2. Describe the governance structure of your campaign. What was helpful and what was challenging about this structure?

[Probes]
   a. Who was involved in the campaign?
   b. Did the structure of the campaign:
      i. Have one central organization/core set of organizations from the beginning?
      ii. Were there additional organizations involved at a less active level? When did these organizations become players in the campaign (from the beginning or later)?
      iii. Who made decisions about the organizations and individuals who needed to be part of the campaign (whose voices, what capacity, which consultants, and which contract professionals)?
      iv. Reflecting on who was involved, were there any gaps? Would you invite others? Who would they be, and why would you invite them?
   c. Probe to think about who might have been missing in terms of perspectives, relationships, influence, fundraising capability and/or expertise they could have brought.
   d. Also probe to think in terms of tactical or functional capacities that may have been missing from the effort (e.g., canvassing, communications, legal, etc.). These gaps may relate more to what kinds of consulting/professional support a campaign was/was not able to hire.
3. How did your campaign make decisions about how to spend money?

4. What were the high- and low-value spends?
   a. Probe for high-/low-value uses of lobbying dollars and for nonlobbying dollars.

5. Did you spend money on both external support (contract/consultant, such as legal counsel, campaign strategists) and tactical execution (such as media or ad buys)? Or just one or the other?
   a. If yes, what types of external support? And was it worth it?

6. At what stages of the campaign were funds/resources infused? Was the availability/lack of funding a limiting factor at any point?

7. Were the funds/resources infused when they were most needed?

8. Was it easier/harder to raise lobbying or nonlobbying dollars?

9. Was it easier/harder to get funding/resources at certain stages of the campaign?
   [Probes]
   a. Did the campaign use its funding appropriately? Did it use enough (or too much) on lobbying/nonlobbying?
   b. Were there any restrictions on the funds you raised that inhibited your campaign’s ability to successfully execute its strategy and tactics? If so, in what way?

10. How much did your organization provide, both dollars and in-kind capacity (such as staff time or other resources)? How did your organization decide what and how much you could contribute?

11. How much did your organization’s contributions to the campaign (financial and in-kind) defer or displace other activities your organization may have done instead?

12. Looking back, were there any gaps in your capacity that you think would have made a difference in either the process or the outcome of this ballot measure? What were they?

13. What were the key successes gained during the ballot process [even if the ballot measure failed]?

14. What key challenges did you [or your campaign] face during the ballot process?

15. [For passed ballot measures] Describe the campaign’s plan for implementation after the ballot measure passed.
   a. How well-prepared was the campaign to monitor/support implementation of the ballot measure? Has there been any opposition or major roadblocks since the election?
Now, I’d like to ask you a few questions about what you learned and what you would do differently.

1. When you think over the entire campaign, what did you learn? What went well during the campaign and what would you do differently?

Probes:

a. Was the ballot measure properly funded (e.g., enough funding, type of funding such as lobbying/nonlobbying)?

2. Did the people and organizations involved have the appropriate capacity to conduct a strong campaign?

3. How well did the ballot measure represent the thoughts of the stakeholders involved?

Probes:

a. Were there any successes or challenges in working with various stakeholders to create the ballot measure? For example, were there any group dynamics that affected the development of the ballot measure?

4. How well did the coalition-building process go?

5. What external factors emerged that influenced the decision, and how did the campaign react to those factors?

6. If you could, what would you do differently during the next ballot cycle? Are there any lessons learned that are specific to implementing ballot measures in Colorado?

Probes:

a. Who would you involve (or try to involve) that wasn’t during the last cycle?

b. What would you include or exclude from the ballot measure?

c. What might you do differently for governance/structure of the campaign?

d. What might you do differently to develop the campaign strategy?

e. What might you do differently in terms of the tactics the campaign invests in executing?

f. What might you do differently in your approach to fundraising?

7. Aside from developing this ballot measure, were there other major outcomes of working on this ballot measure? What were they?

[Examples: Were there any alliances made, coalitions built, networks developed, better understanding of how to build coalitions, understanding of the political process or how to work with government agencies, etc.?]
8. Thinking about future ballot measures, how would Raise the Bar (Amendment 71) change the capacity needed for a strong campaign?

9. Has your campaign and/or organization drafted a postmortem evaluation or reflection on your experiences with this effort? If so, would you be willing to share that with us?

10. Is there anything else you’d like to say that you did not get a chance to say today?

For funders:

First, I’d like to ask you a few questions about your involvement with [insert appropriate issue].

1. How would you describe your role (or your organization’s role) in [insert appropriate ballot measure]? 
   a. How did you first become involved in the campaign? Why did you decide to support the campaign?
   b. What activities/stages were you most involved in? Were you an early funder?
   c. As a funder, what capacity is needed to be a “good funder?”
      i. Reflecting on the campaign, what skills/expertise do you wish you or your organization had?

Next, I’d like to ask you about the life cycle of the ballot measure.

1. Describe how the campaign identified the issue and then moved to a solution using a ballot measure as the tool.

2. Describe the governance structure of the campaign and whether you think it was effective.

Probes:

   a. Who was involved in the campaign?
   b. Did the structure:
      i. Have one central organization from the beginning?
      ii. Were there peripheral organizations? When did the peripheral organizations become players in the campaign (from the beginning or later on)?
      iii. Who made decisions about the organizations and individuals who needed to be part of the campaign (whose voices, what capacity, which consultants and which contract professionals)?
      iv. Reflecting on who was involved, were there any gaps? Would you invite others? Who would they be, and why would you invite them?

3. What were the key successes gained during the ballot process [even if the ballot measure failed]? What key challenges did you [or your campaign] face during the ballot process?
4. [For passed ballot measures] Describe the campaign’s plan for implementation after the ballot measure passed and how well it is working.

   a. How well-prepared was the campaign to implement the ballot measure? Did the campaign face any opposition or major roadblocks?

   b. How successful do you think implementation has and will be to change small “p” policies at either a local or state level?

Now, I’d like to ask you a few questions about what you learned and what you would do differently.

1. When you think over the entire campaign, what did you learn? What went well during the campaign and what would you do differently?

2. What external factors emerged that influenced funding, and how did the campaign react to those factors?

3. Describe the involvement of each funding organization involved in the campaign.

   **Probes:**

   a. How did their involvement influence the outcome?

   b. Did they provide enough funding at the right times? Did they support the ballot measure beyond funding? How was their involvement helpful?

   c. What should they have done differently?

4. If you could, what would you do differently during the next ballot cycle?

5. Are there any lessons learned that are specific to implementing ballot measures in Colorado?

6. Aside from developing this ballot measure, were there other major outcomes of working on this ballot measure? What were they?

   [Examples: Were there any alliances made, coalitions built, networks developed, better understanding of how to build coalitions, understanding of the political process or how to work with government agencies, etc.?]

7. Thinking about future ballot measures, how would Raise the Bar (Amendment 71) change the capacity needed for a strong campaign?

8. Is there anything else you’d like to say that you did not get a chance to say today?

**All interviewees:**

Lastly, who else should we speak with to gain an additional perspective on this ballot measure?

Thank you for your time! If we find, during our analysis, that we need some clarification on anything said today, would you mind if we sent you a quick email to clarify?